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Every discipline represents the reality which concerns it by means of
some formalization; in Architecture, the principal means of formalization
is drawing. This thesis examines architectural drawings as notation
systems. Plan, section, elevation, perspective and isometric projection,
the kinds of drawing most used in architectural work, are discussed as
generic types of images, each of which specifies a partial correspondence
to the physical world by virtue of a particular logic and set of conven-
tions. This logic and the associated conventions characterize each system
and distinguish it from others.
Section 1 reviews a theory of visual perception on which a procedure for
describing each notation system is based.
Section 2 presents an extended discussion of each system: the logic of
each notation, its relation to our visual perception and the graphic con-
ventions which it employs are examined, the potentials and limits of each
system are suggested. Reference is made to the history of the development
of each system and the traditions of its usage. The ways in which the
several systems may be cross-referenced and combined to describe architec-
tural space are considered, as are the conceptual devices scale, grid and
key.
Section 3 outlines four principal contexts in which notation systems are
used. Questions are posed as to the appropriateness of each system in
each of the contexts. The section closes with a discussion of the role
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INTRODUCTION
This is an essay about architectural drawings, especially those kinds
which are most frequently made in architecture school and in practice--
viz. plans, sections, elevations, perspectives and various isometric pro-
jections. Each of these kinds of drawings will be considered as a nota-
tion system, which is simply to say as a consistent and coherent means for
displaying certain aspects of what we understand of buildings and space.
Several observations can be made at the outset. A very large part
of architectural education (and perhaps an even larger part of architectural
practice) consists in manipulating plans, sections and the rest; in inter-
preting or "reading" them, in evaluating them critically, and, not least,
in making them. Such drawings are the currency of the profession: one
need only reflect upon how much time and effort is spent translating what
is observed or dreamed of spaces into a few rather precise and rather spare
notation systems. Yet very little time is spent examining the assumptions
and conventions upon which such systems are based.
,Taken together as notation systems, all the various graphic means by
which architectural space is modeled share several general aspects. Funda-
mentally, each is comprised of a set of elements and a set of rules which
govern their use. Each system is a means of codification by which empiri-
cal phenomena may be formalized and expressed in a manner which is compre-
hensible to those who are familiar with the notation. Each system has been
developed as a complex of conventions and is sustained in its usage by a
general acceptance of those conventions--that is, a consensus on meaning.
Each system is governed by an internal consistency or logic. Each proposes
a particular veridicality--that is, a correspondence of the elements of the
system to the actual phenomena which they describe.
1
Considered individually, however, each particular notation system is
but a partial means of describing the experienced phenomena. The represen-
tation of any space in a given notation subjects the perception of that
space to the "grammar" of the particular notation; it is a formalization,
the imposition of an internally consistent structure on the material of
experience. Such a formalization is, of necessity, a process of selection
and organization: prominence must be given certain aspects of our percep-
tion over others, some must be ignored altogether. In short, we must, to
a considerable extent, edit the material of experience to the particular
requirements of the notation system in order to communicate impressions
and ideas--indeed, to record them at all.1
What this essay proposes, then, is a kind of epistemology of architec-
tural notation. It seeks to clarify how we know what we know from archi-
tectural drawings and, more specifically, what we know from examining one
kind of drawing as opposed to another. To do so, we will try to describe
for each notation system considered what kind of formalization is taking
place. What assumptions are being made about what is experienced in order
to make, for example, a plan of a particular space? What aspects of the
real situation are being selected for representation in each notation and
how are they being organized in the two-dimensional format? What kinds
of consistency are posited by each notation system; what kinds of corres-
pondence does it devise between its elements and their real aspects?
In pursuing this line of discussion, we hope to specify what kinds
of information can and cannot be represented in any particular notation
system. More particularly, what kinds of things may be known directly
from a representation in a given notation; what kinds of things may be
safely inferred, and on what basis are inferences to be made; and, no
less, what kinds of knowing are completely excluded by each.
Similarly, a part of the discussion will address all the notation
systems taken together as a whole--that which we may call generally
"architectural drawing." We will ask how things known via one notation
may be compared with things known by another, and whether the process of
translation from one to another can be meaningfully characterized. Does
an understanding formed on the basis of one mode preclude or reinforce
an understanding formed on the basis of another? What are the terms of
reference or the conventions of translation between systems?
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Finally, we will turn from a consideration of notation systems as
independent abstractions to a discussion of their role as integral parts
of a design process--that is, the context(s) for their use. We will try
to examine whether different design contexts influence or modify the
meaning of particular notation systems; whether the assumptions and con-
straints which we will seek to demonstrate as being intrinsic to each
notation system substantially influence, or are perhaps influenced by,
their usage. Again, we will look here at notation systems individually
and in combination. In this way, we hope to reach some general conclu-
sions about the "potency" of notation systems in the various contexts in
which they are used and perhaps offer tentative hypotheses as to the char-
acteristics of potent systems.
These are both basic and abstract questions. They address the tools
of the profession, the means by which it models the reality on which it
seeks to operate. They ask, in sum, what it means to construct such an
operational reality in much the same way that one might ask of a statis-
tician what it means to array several discrete variables in terms of
scattergrams and equations for curves, or of a biologist what it means to
explain molecular structure in terms of certain diagrams, models and state-
ments describing the behavior of basic elements, or of a poet what it means
to express a relationship by means of metaphor and simile. The equation,
the model, the simile all are tools by which certain correspondences and
equivalences can be made manifest. Each arranges the stuff of experience--
the material of inquiry--in a special form so as to reveal certain aspects,
conceal others and allow for particular kinds of transformations in the
effort to understand.
* * * * *
Such issues admit to several kinds of investigation. One might
undertake an historical analysis, one which sought to trace to its origins
the usage of each notation system, to establish probable antecedents and
patterns of usage in relevant periods of practice. Alternately, one might
examine the contemporary professional contexts in which architectural
drawings are used, contrasting--by a case studies method--the role which
kinds of drawings play in the work of different individuals or groups.
The former study would focus on particular drawings; the latter on the
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design paradigms which produced drawings.
The study which we propose might, by contrast, be called a specula-
tive one. We shall examine the principles on which different kinds of
drawings are based. In so doing, we hope to outline a critique of each
notation system as an entity in and of itself, to suggest what its logic
is and what its limits are. It is this characterization of limits, of
capacity which, we believe, admits to direct description.
To be sure, the three methods are not mutually exclusive. We will
introduce such historical evidence as we have been able to find in the
literature to support several points; so, too, we will refer to some case
study material. But our use of these sources will be of a secondary
rather than primary importance; we have neither the time nor the training
to emulate the historian's (or the social scientist's) method.
It might be observed that speculative inquiry recommends itself by
virtue of the simplicity of its means. Yet it is, nevertheless, a means
by which certain questions, important yet elusive to other methods of
inquiry, may be posed and thoughtfully, if not conclusively, explored.
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INTRODUCTION
Notes
1. This is clearly not a problem of architecture alone; these remarks
apply to the use of notation systems generally, regardless of the
particular field (cf. Goodman (20), Simon (40), and others). As
Ivins has put it, "In order to have ideas about the returns given us
about nature by our five senses, it is necessary to have some system
of symbols by which to represent those returns and some grammar or
rule by which those symbols are given logical relationships. Lacking
such symbols, or a grammar for their use, the task of thinking
becomes too onerous to be carried very far." Ivins (24), p. 7.
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SECTION 1
Implicit in what has been said thus far is the notion that all drawing,
and especially what we have called architectural drawing, is an arrangement
of selected information which exists in the environment. This seemingly
obvious and unobjectionable statement stands at the center of a long con-
troversy in fields as diverse as perceptual psychology, art history and
criticism, aesthetic theory and recent writing on "environmental meaning."
It poses a dilemma for our discussion, for much of the debate in these
fields is tangential or irrelevant to our purposes. And yet, any discussion
of architectural drawings which seeks to deal with the content of drawings
as information in the environment must eventually face several important
and difficult questions: How is this information known to us? Does the
process by which we come to know it influence the ways in which we repre-
sent it in drawings? And, once represented in drawings, what relationship
does the process of understanding such information from drawings bear to
the process of understanding the information in the environment itself?
It is this last question which has particularly -engaged the attention
of perceptual psychologists and historians of art, as well as several
philosophers. Most of the argument has centered on the issue of illu-
sionistic representation, those manufactured images which look "as if they
were real."1 This debate is clearly secondary to our purposes, although
the discussion of perspective below will inevitably have to make reference
to it. Yet we raise it here because much of the most significant recent
theorizing on the nature of our perception and its relationship to our
representations has been spawned by the insistent question of illusion.
We shall try to summarize briefly the salient features of a theory of
perception which takes as its basis the notion of information in the per-
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ceived environment. We shall try to develop at the same time the conse-
quences of such a theory for representation and particularly its signifi-
cance for an understanding of the development and use of architectural
notation systems. We hope to suggest, at least as a working hypothesis,
what the information in the environment is, what the information in draw-
ings is, what relationship the two have to each other, and by what pro-
cesses we come to understand and make judgements about them. 2
Our principal perceptual means of understanding space is visual,
which is to say, in the context of the theory to be presented, the princi-
pal informational cues by which we understand spatial phenomena are visu-
al.3 It should be made clear that Gibson's theory is not confined to
visual considerations, but extends to all the senses.4 But it is primarily
with vision that Gibson is concerned and it is only his discussion of
vision which we will elaborate here.
Gibson describes visual perception as the discernment of structured
information in the environment (environment is used in its original sense,
viz. surround). This information consists in the "...formless and time-
less invariants that specify the distinct features..." of objects and
spaces.5 At first this assertion may seem paradoxical: surely we don't
see formless and timeless invariants in looking at objects or spaces but,
on the contrary, variable forms which may vary in time. To develop his
point, Gibson draws a distinction between two kinds of vision or, perhaps
better, two kinds of visual realms and visual processes. These are the
visual field and the visual world.
The visual field is the single aspect or view, that "...which seems
to be experienced when one concentrates on what it feels like to see."
The visual field is characterized by the fact that it seems to be displaced
when moves one's eyes or head, appears to rotate when one lies on one's
side, and has an apparent boundary "...between inner content and outer
nothingness, or indeterminacy." 6
The visual world, by contrast, is the phenomenal world which:
"...has the property of being stable and unbounded. By sta-
bility is meant the fact that it does not seem to move when
one turns his eyes or turns himself around.. .and that it does
not seem to tilt when one inclines his head. By unboundedness
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is meant the fact that it does not seem to have anything like
a circular or oval window frame. The phenomenal world seems
to stay put, to remain upright, and to surround one completely.
This experience is what a theory of perception must explain." 7
Both of these--visual field and visual world--are parts of our visual
perception; indeed, as we shall see, the former is in fact contained in
the latter. But though they are difficult to distinguish in experience,
the conceptual difference between them is crucial to distinctions which
we will make between kinds of architectural drawings below.
The visual field may be considered as the product of "pure" vision,
that which takes place when a fixed eye contemplates a fixed scene for
a split instant, the registration of a visual image or aspect solely
by visual means. The visual world, on the other hand, is a product of
what might be called "composite" vision. We come to know the visual world
by moving through it and correlating the visual stimuli we receive with
other kinds of sense information, particularly tactile, haptic and
kinesthetic (touching, holding and self-motion). 8
These distinctions can be more clearly drawn by explication of the
perceptual processes which are involved in experiencing the visual field
and the visual world. The former is experienced by what Gibson calls
"simultaneous grasping," for by definition all components of the aspect
are registered by the eye at once. The visual world is experienced by
"successive sampling," by which is meant the composite process we have
described above, the correlation of discrete aspects with exploratory
movement. Simultaneous grasping is a process of the apprehension of
adjacencies in space. Successive sampling is a process of the apprehen-
sion of sequences in time. The same information may be apprehended by
either process (an example which Gibson uses in a somewhat different
context is the recognition of a word, first by seeing it written out
[simultaneous grasping], then by having it spelled out orally by someone
else, letter by letter [successive sampling]). The knowledge--that is,
the information apprehended--is in both cases the same, although the
material--that is, the information displayed--and the manner in which it
is perceived are different. The two processes are therefore functionally
equivalent yet conceptually distinct.
To return to the discussion of vision--in our experience, visual field
8
and visual world are seldom, if ever, separate. Although we recognize
the theoretical possibility of a single frozen aspect, we seldom actually
perceive one. In the normal course of events we move our eyes, head and
body with respect to what we are viewing.9
The same, of course is true of spaces with respect to our movement
through them. Now, if the visual world consists of a successive sampling
of visual information in association with exploratory movement, then the
discrete parts of that visual information must be what we have called
visual fields. Indeed, the two parts of visual perception now collapse
into one or, to be more precise, the visual field may now be understood
as contained in the visual world. The two parts of vision are reconciled
as one process by which the phenomenal world is known.
It may be asked why the distinction between visual field and world
is retained if the former is simply a part of the latter which alone is
the whole of the process by which visual information is known. In his
later writings, Gibson largely avoids the notion of visual field as
unimportant because perceptually not experienced. Indeed, his larger
theory is much more forcefully argued without it. We have retained it,
and to some extent reinforced it, by the one-to-one association with
simultaneous grasping (which Gibson does not explicitly do) because it
has considerable explanatory power in an analysis of notation systems.
Gibson acknowledges the value of the notion in this regard by suggesting
that visual field was really the product of the development of a represen-
tational art. There was, he argues, no need and therefore no value in
considering the information of vision as aspect until the problem of
producing representational images on flat surfaces was posed. Thus, man
did not see aspects until he made them.1 0
* * * * *
And what is the visual information? Gibson argues that we use the
process of visual perception purposefully to establish the identity of
things and that identity consists in the constancies of objects and spaces
which do not change when subjected to our visual scrutiny: "An individual
who explores a strange place by locomotion produces transformations of
the optic array for the very purpose of isolating what remains invariant
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during these transformations." And so, too, "...the individual who scans
a strange room actively produces samples of the array so as to establish
its permanent features."11 In this respect, the visual field or aspect
is not the visual information at all as it is always changing, never
constant--indeed seldom, if ever, perceived. The visual information must
rather be located in other parts of the composite process of successive
sampling of the visual world; that is, in the tactile, haptic and kines-
thetic correlates of our visual exploration.1 2
* * * * *
Perhaps we can now briefly and succinctly restate the essential ele-
ments of this theory. Environmental information consists in the invari-
ants or permanent features of objects and spaces. Visual perception is
the processing of the visual presentation of this information. It may
be considered as having two component, nested parts--visual fields or
aspects and visual world (it may be useful to call these "concepts" as
distinct from "aspects"). There are two nested processes at work in
making sense of visual information: simultaneous grasping and successive
sampling. The first is a purely visual phenomenon while the second is a
composite of visual with other sensation. It is by the latter process
that we come to know the invariants of an object or space--that is, that
we form a conception of what it is. But it is significant that we also
have the capacity to "read" single aspects and to draw inferences and
conclusions--that is, form knowledge about the invariants of objects and
spaces on that basis alone.
The distinction between aspect and concept goes to the heart of how
we form a visual understanding of the world. One of the implications of
Gibson's theory is that it is our comprehension of concept which allows
us to perceive aspect at all. It is, for example, our knowing that the
trapezoidal void set in the undefined surface which we see is, in fact,
a rectangular window in an orthogonal wall which enables us to see the
window. In short, we know that the world is different from what we see
of it, and it is knowing this which allows us to see the world "as it is."
This has several consequences.
First, it means that we have the ability to relate any given aspect
of an object or space to all other aspects in a consistent fashion. This
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consistency is key, for it is the test of our concept. The concept may
be considered as an hypothesis which consistently and coherently explains
all variability in appearance. Furthermore, it allows us to infer exter-
nal conditions as the causes of variability in appearance. For example,
I know that the elliptical opening of the coffee mug on the table in front
of me is, "in fact," round; that its trapezoidal shape is, "in fact,"
cylindrical; that the irregularly curved, mobius-like strip on its side
is, "in fact," a regularly curved handle of constant thickness. I under-
stand all these apparent distortions in shape are a function of my parti-
cular position with respect to the mug. Furthermore, I know that
although one side of the same mug appears to be a glossy purple, spotted
and streaked with silver, and the other side a dull black that it is,
"in fact," the same dark blue color over its entire surface. I understand
that distortions in color are a function of directional illumination.
Finally, I know that the two mugs across the room on the shelf which
appear to be so much smaller than the one directly before me are, "in
fact," the same size. I understand that distortions in size are a func-
tion of distance. Each of these distortions can be dismissed as attri-
butable to external conditions which modify appearance: position, illu-
mination, distance. By so explaining them away, what is seen remains con-
sistent with what is known to be.
The understanding is, in each instance, an implicit test of the visual
concept, the formless and timeless invariants of the mug--what it is--
for it proceeds from the conviction that, were I to change the external
conditions which create these distortions, I could indeed verify that the
shape, color and size of the mug are what I know them to be. Indeed, the
notion of the invariant identity of objects allows for a gauge or measure
of the distortions: by apparent shape I can judge my position vis-a-vis
the mug; by apparent color I can tell where the light is coming from and
of what intensity it is; by the apparent discrepancy in sizes I can judge
the distance between objects.
But this implicit test of verification between what is known and what
appears bears further scrutiny. For if I were really in doubt as to the
roundness of the elliptical opening, I would change my position with
respect to it (or, more likely, pick it up and so change it with respect
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to me) and so "prove" to myself that the opening is round. Similarly, to
establish the uniformity of surface color I would change the ambient
illumination or hold the mug "up to the light" and so establish its color.
So, too, I would get the mugs from across the room and put them next to
the one before me and so "prove" the constancy of size. But there is
something of a paradox here, for in each instance what I am really doing
is changing the way in which the object looks--that is, I am changing its
aspect to construct these "proofs." It would seem, therefore, as if cer-
tain aspects correspond with the visual concept better than others--or
at least we treat them as if they do.
Let us confine the example to distortion of shape and the relativity
of position: How can we know that the opening of the mug is round?
1 3
We have already demonstrated that the visual concept of the mug (that it
has a round opening) satisfactorily accounts for all the perspective dis-
ortions (aspects) which may actually appear. Surely this means that every
aspect must stand equally for all the others. If, however, I am in doubt
as to whether the opening of the mug is actually round or not, I will make
the test of verification explicitly by looking at the mug in a very parti-
cular way. I will hold it so that it is perpendicular to my line of sight,
so that the opening is "facing me," which is to say so that its aspect is
a circle, if indeed the opening is round. It seems that there is one
particular aspect which conforms to the concept of a round opening--namely,
when the outline of the opening is a circle. And that occurs only when
the opening faces me.
To return to Gibson's terminology, it seems that there is a moment at
which the visual world is contained in the visual field instead of vice
versa and that this moment can be described by a very particular positional
relationship. The visual concept may be verified by inspecting particu-
lar aspects; the formless and timeless invariants have, for certain pur-
poses at least, a particular form. Thus we may say that there are some
aspects which are homologous with the concept.
We have outlined above the composite nature of the experience of the
visual world--the integration of visual sensory information with tactile,
haptic and kinesthetic. It is all these sensory inputs together, we said,
which create the visual world and the substance of our concepts. Yet our
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verification of roundness has not made mention of them. So far, we have
only made a judgement about an aspect-that is, our test has only used the
data of the visual field ("the outline is a circle, therefore the opening
must be round"). How does the verification test of the roundness of the
mug relate to these other sensory components of our knowledge of the
visual world?
We might alternately test for roundness by holding the mug in cupped
hands to find if it "feels round." Or, with greater accuracy, by running
one finger around the opening: I will be convinced that the mug is round
if I can move my finger all the way around the edge of the opening to the
point at which I started without feeling any change of curvature. By yet
another method, I might stretch my finger across the opening from one edge
to the other and rotate the mug slowly with my other hand: if the mug
touches my finger in the same two places as I turn it, then it is round.
Of course, a somewhat less awkward way of accomplishing the same thing is
to measure the distance across the mug in several places: after esta-
blishing that a sufficient number of these diameters are equal, I am again
convinced that the mug is round. And, with a little basic geometry, I can
avoid measuring so many diameters and achieve a more rigorous accuracy
with only two measurements--one diameter and the circumference.
We have now tested for the roundness of the opening of the mug in
three distinct ways. We have discovered a particular aspect in which the
opening appears to be a circle; we have established by touch constant
curvature, which is only true of circles; and, by measuring--a surrogate
for touch--two critical dimensions and relating them by a formula, we have
established circularity by yet another means. We have also demonstrated
two of Gibson's basic tenets. Knowledge formed on the basis of "pure"
vision (visual field) is equivalent to, though conceptually distinct from,
knowledge formed on the basis of "composite" vision (visual world). There
is a further equivalence between knowledge gained via simultaneous grasping
and via successive sampling, although these two processes are conceptually
distinct as well.
In discovering one aspect which has a direct correspondence to the
haptic-tactile component of our knowledge--that is, one positional rela-
tionship between our line of sight and the object in which distortion is
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eliminated, we have in effect formulated a way of looking at things--
indeed, the way of looking at things. The value of such a formulation is
that it gives us not only a way of double-checking our haptic-tactile per-
ception of familiar objects but also a prescription for understanding
unfamiliar ones. We come to expect that what the object is is what it
appears to be from a particular point of view perpendicular to it.14
Thus objects can be compared and the unfamiliar described in terms of the
familiar. By having a consistent position from which we agree that the
aspects of objects in some sense correspond with their concepts, the way
of knowing one thing becomes the way of knowing all.
* * * * *
The correspondence of visual field and visual world and the equiva-
lence of simultaneous grasping and successive sampling as perceptual pro-
cesses are also significant notions in describing our perception of the
built surround and, in one guise or another, figure in much of the litera-
ture. Lynch has written at length on what he calls "environmental image,"
the general framework of understanding which the individual forms of any
given environment through his use of it, which undergoes constant revision
and modification with increased familiarity.
Lynch sees the process of formulating such an image as firmly rooted
in "purposeful way-finding,"1 5 In his discussion of the five categories of
elements which comprise the environmental image, Lynch attributes a domi-
nant role to paths, "...which may be a principal resource in organization
at the metropolitan scale [and] have intimate interrelations with other
element types." 16
Lynch's emphasis on path and the sequential nature of our perception
of the environment echoes Gibson's distinction between simultaneous grasp-
ing and successive sampling as equivalent perceptual modes, as well as the
interrelationship of visual field and visual world. What we see at any
moment, Lynch suggests, we in turn relate to the image of the visual world
which we have built up from a myriad of such discrete aspects in our move-
ment through them. But the importance of movement and sequence in our
understanding of the built environment points to one other component of the
perceptual process to which we have alluded above, but which deserves more
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explicit consideration here--that is, the temporal element in our visual
perception.
We referred earlier to the distinction between spatial adjacencies and
temporal succession and their respective, and complementary, roles in
perception.1 7  In a discussion of architectural space (and no less in the
discussion of notation systems), the importance of the temporal structure
of our perception must be acknowledged. Indeed, it may be argued that the
"structure of the time of our perception" plays an essential role in our
aesthetic appreciation of a work of architecture. The "time of the work"
may be seen as an element intrinsic to the work itself, a constituent part
of its aesthetic significance.
Such a view casts the aesthetic discourse in the light of the paradox
of perception of architectural space. We know that in its essence space is
whole, contained, unchanging, yet in our experience of it--upon which
aesthetic appreciation must ultimately rest--space is partial and transi-
tory. The whole to which we aspire in understanding we must construct.
The work of Souriau and others places the emphasis on the temporal succes-
sion of this process by which we construct or assemble meaning. The cen-
tral question becomes that of what cues the object or space itself may
provide which guide our exploration, our "view absorbing execution" of
.18
To be sure, in the plastic arts this temporal succession of a work
cannot be determined or ordered in the same way as it is in musical or
literary works. Still, any work of architecture must inevitably set up
principal directions and patterns of choice vis-a-vis movement which will
result in particular successions of aspects which then become the material
to which a hierarchical order may be given.
Once such a condition is admitted, the range of devices which may be
introduced to provide coherence or counterpoint to architectural space is
limited only by imagination (that of the designer and the observor). We
need not insist that meaning is created solely by temporal succession to
nonetheless assign it a part, and potentially a very large one. The infor-
mation presented in any individual aspect of a space may be given a de-
signed relationship of a very particular sort to selected other aspects.
To the extent that our inspection of the space reveals such relationships,
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we establish thematic connections between the successive aspects. These
connections in turn may structure expectations about the aspects which
follow and, in so doing, direct our attention to particular aspects as
opposed to others.19 And so, to the extent that we become conscious of
and respond to such cues we enter, in Souriau's terms, the "universe of
the work" and its "intrinsic time." These notions have a direct parallel
in the information theory. The scanning process by which we build the
visual world may be directed by the information in corresponding but
separate aspects. And, we may add, to the extent that the particular suc-
cession of aspects influences the way in which we form the concept (the
environmental image, the idea of the space), any artifice by which the
succession of aspects is structured or one succession made more prominent,
likely or meaningful than another, will influence our formation of concept
and hence our understanding. 2 0
This consideration of temporal succession bears on architectural
drawings in two distinct ways. First, insofar as any particular drawing
is an independent work, it too will have an "intrinsic time"--that is,
the time in which we inspect the image will be structured to some extent by
components of the drawing itself: the amount and clarity of detail; the
use of shade and color; the general composition, and so on. We will sug-
gest in the next section that different kinds of drawings, and different
kinds of notation systems, have different kinds of "intrinsic time"--that
the "reading" of a perspective, for example, engages the viewer in time in
a way that is significantly different from the reading of a plan.
But insofar as architectural drawings--individually and particularly
in combination--provide information about space in the visual world, the
"intrinsic time" of the images has another significance. Souriau builds
on Beaudelaire's notion of art as "the mnemonics of the beautiful"--that
is, the direction and prolongation of the period of contemplation. Insofar
as this is viewed as one of the bases of the aesthetic of the work, we may
seek indications of it in the representation of the work as well; our
reading of a group of drawings may communicate something of what we might
expect of the "view-absorbing execution," the experience of the space
itself. To this end, architectural drawings may be deliberately manipu-
lated to simulate the temporal component of the work as it is designed
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(cf. Thiel (45) and (46), Lynch et al. (30)). But even if the "intrinsic
time" of the space is not singled out for special study, the "intrinsic
time" of the drawings which stand for the space may nevertheless condition
our understanding of it.21
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SECTION
Notes
1. It is difficult to state the issue without standing in one of the
several camps; "look as if," "resemblance," "imitation," "depiction,"
are terms among many others which have become highly charged in the
debate over the nature of illusion--indeed "illusion" itself has been
appropriated.
2. The reader interested in the particulars of the debate on illusion
will find the two extreme positions as well as a third alternative
which is the crux of the information theory to be presented below
well summarized in J.J. Gibson (15). The debate may be followed in
Gombrich (18), Wollheim (48) and Goodman (20). See also Arnheim (6)
and Black (19). A more general presentation of the competing theories
in the psychology of perception and a rigorous argument for the
information-based theory may be found in Gibson (16).
3. cf. Gibson (16).
4. On the role of auditory and other non-visual cues in spatial perception
see ibid, pp. 52-55 and Ch. IV-VII.
5. Gibson (15), p. 31.
6. Gibson (16), p. 253.
7. Ibid.
8. "In the absolutism of the visual world, we are conscious of the
invariant size and form of things and of their substantiality in
their own right without relation to other objects. In the more
relative visual field, we are aware of how things change in shape,
size and proportion with respect to position and distance from fixed
eyes, (and from each other)." Edgerton (14), p. 10.
9. "When one walks around an object, or sees it rotating, its optic
array [the visual information it provides] undergoes perspective
transformation and the whole family of perspectives is available to
the eye so that the invariants are easy to see and the single perspec-
tives are not; in fact, it is then almost impossible to see a single
perspective. This is the normal way of seeing an object. On the
other hand, when one holds still, it is easier to see the single per-
spective than when one moves around. But this is not the normal
way of seeing an object. Gibson (15), pp. 31-32.
10. "I also believe that our primitive ancestors, before the discovery of
pictorial representation by the cave painters, had never noticed the
aspects of objects and the perspectives of the environment. They
could only take the naive attitude toward the world. Why should the
Ice Age hunters have noticed that the mammoth had a different
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appearance from the front, the side, the rear and above. Why should
they have observed that a thing appears to get smaller as it gets
further away? What use would there be to have paid any attention to
linear perspective and vanishing points and the optical horizon?
But as our ancestors began increasingly to make pictures, they began
to notice these appearances. They began to see aspects, perspectives,
in short, forms. The man who painted the mammoth on the cave wall
had to notice and remember one aspect (usually the side view), since
the necessity of making tracings on a flat surface required it....And
so it was, I think, that some men began sometimes to take the per-
spective attitude in viewing the environment. They began to be able
to see the world as a picture.. .But they had to learn to do so."
Ibid, p. 32. There is considerable evidence to suggest that an
analogous process characterizes the development of learning to make
images in childhood.
11. Gibson (16), p. 264.
12. " ...the invariants of the object or the space provide for the detec-
tion of same thing along with the detection of different aspect.
Locomotion thus eventuates in a sort of cognitive map, consisting of
the invariants common to all the perspectives. This helps to esta-
blish the recognition of the objects contained in the perspectives."
Gibson (16), p. 278.
13. The thrust of the arguments for illumination and distance would be
the same but -the mechanisms are different and to avoid confusion we
shall look only at shape.
14. This is, of course, overly simplified for each perpendicular aspect
presents but one side of the object; nevertheless, we understand the
visual concept to accord with the sum of the aspects perpendicular
to the sides of the object. We shall have more to say on this below.
15. "In the process of way-finding, the strategic link is the envornmental
image, the generalized mental picture of the exterior physical world
that is held by the individual. This image is both the product of
immediate sensation and the memory of past experience and it is used
to interpret information and to guide action." Lynch (28), p. 4.
See also Lynch (29), p. 219.
16. Lynch (28), p. 84. The others are node, edge, landmark and district.
Although Lynch was not working explicitly with Gibson's model of
perception, the latter's early work clearly informs much of the
thinking; the five categories of elements, insofar as they are pieces
of a mental image of the environment, are precisely analogous to what
Gibson calls concepts and the visual world. Yet as actual entities
in the environment, Lynch's elements are a mixed lot--lndmarks,
edges and, to a lesser extent, paths, have corresponding aspects;
nodes and districts however are exclusively conceptual categories with
no corresponding single aspects (see also Appleyard (4), Carr (10)
and Thiel (46)).
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17. "The idea that 'space' is perceived whereas 'time' is remembered lurks
at the back of our thinking. But these abstractions borrowed from
physics are inappropriate...Adjacent order and successive order are
better abstractions, and these are not found separate....Even at its
simplest, a stimulus has some successive order as well as some adjacent
order.... This means that natural stimulation consists of successions
as truly as it does of adjacencies. The former are on the same
footing as the latter." Gibson (16), p. 276.
18. See Souriau (42). In so far as it is offered to the sight, to the
aesthetic appreciation, to the emotion or to the contemplation, the
cathedral is successive: it delivers itself little by little in dif-
ferent spectacles which are never simultaneous. The cathedral of
Chartres, seen from afar rising above the plain of Beauce, or from
nearby when one is in the cathedral court; seen from a straight-front
view or obliquely, or from the side; seen finally from the interior,
according to whether one has just entered by the west door or whether
through a series of changing perspectives one slowly approaches the
choir;--presents with each aspect an artistic quantity which is abso-
lutely different, and no one of them is seen simultaneously with
any other.
"No doubt, the physical frame inclosing these successive aspects
remains materially unchanging. No matter. The disc on which a musi-
cal composition is recorded also remains materially unchanging. The
disc, however, is but an instrument for the orderly presentation of
the work which itself is the structural law of the latter and which
governs the musical execution. One must see in the same way the move-
ment of the spectator around the statue or the architectural monument
as a plastic or view-absorbing execution, which unfolds in order the
various aspects which are held within the physical frame, and which
are the aesthetic reason for that frame as it was planned.
"...the lover of cathedrals is held to an extremely set order which
obliges him to regard in continuity and through a regular and some-
times irreversible succession, the various aspects through which an
harmonious impression is established. He will proceed to the per-
spectives of the nave only after the main portal has been presented
to him, like an opening chord; he will see the windows of the transept
appear only as a kind of surprise of sudden modulation after the pro-
cession in regular harmony of the perspectives of the nave, modified
at each step throughout its length. And who will dare to say that
this ordered succession is unimportant, or that it has not been artis-
tically foreseen by the genius of the architect?" Souriau, pp. 124-125
It may be objected that the cathedral is a singularly manipulative
architectural creation with respect to sequence and time and that
spaces with less formal directionality, less programmatic unity or a
more plural range of symbolic associations would admit to far less
by way of a significant ordered succession. Yet Souriau's point is
subtler than at first might appear, for separations in space must of
necessity structure temporal orders of succession and though we may be
hard pressed to describe, in any given example, a single preferred
or even a set of dominant orders, the fact that the temporal order
conditions our perception of architectural space is inescapable.
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19. Leo Steinberg's successive "readings" of S. Carlo a1le Quatro
Fontane of Borromini is an excellent example of this (Steinberg,
(44)). On the role of expectation as a directive force in perceptual
processes in general, see Gibson (16), pp. 266-286 and especially pp.
279-280.
20. On this last point several intriguing remarks are offered in Sauvage
(35). She suggests that this may be a provisional temporality, cf.
G. Brelet: "...at the moment when one becomes aware of the comple-
tion of the whole, the conscious mind loses the temporal movement
which had been stimulated by the incomplete vision of the whole."
I am not convinced that this is so--the mental image or concept
("completion of the whole") of some kinds of spaces clearly includes
the element of meaningful sequence of succession of particular as-
pects, and there are buildings in which the idea is primarily one of
structure as controlled sequence (the Guggenheim and Carpenter Center
are obvious contemporary examples; see also N. Wu's interpretation of
the approach to the Forbidden City in Peking). Sauvage suggests that
there are four kinds of time, or temporal modes, present in various
combination and in varying degree in every work of art. These are:
Tl, historical time (aging, "clock time"); T2, the time required to
perceive the work and the ways in which the work may structure our
perception of it in time (this is what we have discussed above);
T3, which is the complex of temporal significations of the thing
represented, or "time evoked" (Sauvage is primarily concerned with
representational art and so intends, for example, the ages of the
persons represented in paintings, the presence of a tomb, as a
reference to those who had lived before, etc. A corollary in archi-
tecture might be found in what is often called historicism, the self-
conscious reference by detail or even in plan to earlier buildings--
for example, a contemporary architect's use of the classical orders;
indeed, the Renaissance use of the orders represents the evocation of
a particular time); T4 is seen as time itself represented as the sub-
ject of the work.
21. Lowenthal and Prince (27) amplify this point: "Works of art are not
wholly congruent with everyday experience, as the words distill and
encapsulate imply. Selecting and crystallizing, highlighting some
features and shadowing others, they resemble landscapes of memory more
than those of actuality. This is a function not only of the work
itself, but also of our involvement with it. When we look at a
picture, we suspend our normal sense of time and place to enter ima-
ginatively into another realm, just as we do when we consciously
recall our own past; and we attend to this other mode of being for
its own sake rather than for some practical purpose...", p. 126.
Architectural drawings are not, in this sense, works of art--they
are most often attended to for some "practical purpose." Yet some-
thing of that same suspension of normal time characterizes our
engagement of them.
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SECTION 2
We are now ready to turn to a direct discussion of architectural
drawings. As outlined above, we start with the premise that such drawings
are an encoding of parts of the information which we do actually, or may
potentially, perceive in the environment. As such, drawings are represen-
tations (in the most literal sense of that word) of the things we know
about space, either the concepts of the visual world or the aspects of
visual fields. That which is systematic in the notation concerns the
correspondences which it makes to these two components of our visual per-
ception, what information is selected and how it is displayed. The system
may be thought of as the logic by which the visual world and the visual
fields are represented in the drawing.
The value of the information theory we have presented in Section 1
in the discussion of systems of notation is that it provides a means by
which to proceed in an analysis of the logic and conventions of each. The
question of how space is understood in a particular drawing may be re-
phrased in terms of what kind of information the system (of which the
drawing is but an instance) is structured to represent. As we elaborate
this question with others, a method of analysis is developed. Does the
information represented in the system correspond to a visual field or to
the visual world, and so is the particular drawing representing "pure" or
"composite" visual information? What are the terms of correspondence between
the drawing and its referent (i.e., the rules of the system): Which con-
stancies in the space represented are constant in the representation, which
distorted, and how? What parts of the space are being shown and in what
relationship do these stand to one another as represented in the drawing?
What are the particular graphic conventions of the notation system which
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accomplish this? What is the position of the viewer (and the maker) of
the drawing--that is, from where is it to be seen? What cues does the
drawing provide which give us an understanding of the third dimension?
What does it tell us about time?
In this section we will provide a description of each notation system
based on answers to the set of questions which we have just outlined.
To the extent that it seems relevant, we will try to say something about
the history of each notation system, its development and dissemination as
a technique for the representation of architectural space. We will also
consider several ways in which different notation systems can be combined
and cross-referenced to each other. Finally, we will discuss those concep-
tual devices by which the information of the notation systems is indexed
to other kinds of information about the space they represent.
ORTHOGONAL SYSTEMS
First we shall consider those systems which collectively may be
termed orthogonal: plan, section and elevation. These systems share fun-
damental assumptions, a method of construction and a set of conventions
with respect to the way in which space is represented. Plan and section
are, in some sense, reciprocal images while elevation may be taken to be a
special instance of section. Taken together, the orthogonal systems pro-
vide a "complete" description of any space--complete, at least, in a very
particular sense, with respect to certain kinds of information. This
descriptive complimentarity has a long tradition and particular historical
precedents, which we will outline below. Considered separately, however,
plan, section and elevation each have a distinct and dramatically different
significance which determines, in large measure, the utility and potency
of each system as a representation of space.
Orthogonal systems provide an image of a given space as if viewed
from an infinite number of hypothetical vantage points, each perpendicular
to every represented feature. All space-defining elements--that is,
planes, surfaces and objects--are drawn in terms of the outline of their
edges, rendered as if they were equidistant from the observer, without any
of the visual distortions that would be present in an image made from a
single, actual viewpoint. Hence, the position of the viewer with respect
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the space represented in orthogonal images is located in some abstracted
"outside"--above the space of the plan, in front of the space of the
section and elevation. There is no actual point at which we stand: we
find ourselves at no real distance from the image. The space of the
drawing exists without reference to the position from which we engage it.
In each case, the features of the space are drawn as if they were
reflected directly onto an imaginary plane. For the plan, this plane
is parallel to the surface of the ground; for section and elevation it is
perpendicular. In each case, the surface of the page is taken to be coin-
cident with this imaginary plane, a kind of screen upon which all the edges
of the space-defining elements below or behind it are traced.
Orthogonal drawings are pre-eminently representations of the visual
world, translations of composite visual information--indeed, they contain
no purely visual information whatsoever. Thus, they are an encoding of
haptic and tactile sense perception, a visualization of metric relation-
ships. The lines of the plan represent length, breadth and position; those
of the section and elevation, height, breadth and position. In each case
there is no relation to any real visual field, hence the colloquialism of
"top view" for plan and "side view" for section is a misnomer. Orthogonal
representations are very particular concepts (in the sense in which we
have defined that term in Section 1); they represent the information of
the visual world without reference to any visual field.
The orthogonal systems show us things as we know them to be: the
metric relationships in plan, section and elevation correspond to the
metric relationships in the dimensions of the space represepted in each
case. We may say that there are isomorphisms of measure and angle between
orthogonal images and the spaces they represent; each angle between lines
in the image is identical to the corresponding angle between edges of con-
tiguous surfaces in the space. So, too, the lengths of the lines in the
representation correspond by direct ratio to the measure of the surfaces
in space.
Clearly each orthogonal system only encodes information about two
dimensions of space. Because in each instance two dimensions are repre-
sented visually without the distortions of parallax, the third dimension
(vertical for plan, horizontal for section and elevation) is necessarily
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"flattened." The logic of construction of the systems does not provide
for any way to gauge the distance of a given edge from the imaginary plane
on which it is represented. In plan, for example, the sill of the window
is ostensibly part of the same plane as the floor. Such ambiguities are,
in each case, most clearly resolved by making reference to drawings of
another sort, an aspect of the complimentarity of such images. However,
in each system a number of graphic conventions have been developed to
assist the immediate visual reading of the absent third dimension from the
individual image. Customarily, the edges of the surfaces through which
the imaginary plane is "cut" are rendered darker than those which are
deeper in the space of the drawing. In plan and section, the thickness
or void of the wall is often shaded or otherwise coded. Continuous sur-
faces--horizontal in plan, vertical in section and elevation--may be toned
so as to suggest their relative distance from the plane of the cut and
their continuity beneath or behind objects closer to the plane which may
partially obscure them.1
Such devices are sometimes also used to describe attributes of space-
defining elements on "the other side" of the plane--that is, above the level
at which the plan is taken as, for example, the representation in broken
outline of a vaulting pattern in the ceiling or of a structural overhang.
(An analogous convention is sometimes used in section, although it is
usually more straightforward simply to make another section. Elevations
may sometimes include indications of the attributes of the space behind
the plane which is shown.)
All of these graphic devices are designed to enrich the total under-
standing which may be derived from orthogonal images by visually differen-
tiating information according to the level at which it occurs and thus
giving some indication of the third dimension. Such "depth," however, does
not have the same correspondence to actuality as does the information pre-
sented for the other dimensions: it is always approximate and illusory.
The overriding conventions and the rules of construction of the systems
collapse the space--vertically or horizontally as the case may be--and
provide no means for measuring real displacement.2
These, then, are the consistent logic and conventions of the ortho-
gonal notation systems. As far as we have gone, the systems are identical.
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The differences in their individual significance therefore do not follow
from theoretical or structural differences in the assumptions of each, but
rather from the differing significance of the dimensions of space and the
space-defining elements which each system represents.
PLAN
A plan represents the surface of human action in space, the plane of
movement. This is fundamental to an understanding of its significance as
a system. The plane of movement has a curious quality of seeming ever
unique: although there may be places in a given setting where transparency,
void or juxtaposition create an awareness of several potential planes of
movement simultaneously, there is, nevertheless, a tendency to experience
the given plane on which one stands as singular and discrete. Furthermore,
a plan represents this plane of movement with a completeness which is not
achieved by any other form of representation. The singularity and com-
pleteness of the plane of movement as an experiential fact is reinforced
by the logic of the plan representation itself: the absent third dimension
and the other layers of the space (other plans) are not read as incomple-
tions or inconsistencies of the image at hand, but rather as other
domains, separate from what is represented. (As we shall argue below,
this is not true of sections.)
For these reasons, the plan accommodates several different interpre-
tations simultaneously. Because the continuous enclosing perimeter of the
space is clear as the outer edge of the plan image, we may read the entire
space as an isolated and identifiable figure with respect to its surround.
In this sense, the plan may be seen as a kind of diagramatic emblem of the
space, a statement of its essential form. Indeed, plans may be greatly
simplified, even distorted, ard yet retain this quality of standing for,
of conjuring, the whole. There is a fundamental sense in which the plan
is synonymous with the idea.3
At the same time, the plan illustrates the relationship of the figure
(space, idea) to its surround and to other such figures insofar as these
are part of the surround. Thus, we may read the relationship of one figure
to others; the plan represents the interrelationship of built ideas. We
may also read the ground between such figures (negative) as a figure
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itself (positive); thus the plan represents the reciprocity of built and
unbuilt ideas.
Alternately, we may read our way "through" the plan, following in
mind's eye each of the possible paths by which the plane of movement could
be transversed. The significance of the plan here is that it represents
all conceivable paths--all possible movement--in a single image.
Finally, a plan is a representation of invariant relationships, of
separations and continuities in space. It is significant in this respect
that a plan has no "correct" orientation, no top or bottom. The absence of
any specified orientation vis-a-vis the space represented in the drawing
allows us to rotate the plan at will, to consider it from any angle. The
information which it is designed to convey is indifferent to our vantage.
SECTION
Whereas a plan shows us the length and breadth of the plane on which
we move and the location of the vertical surfaces which confine movement,
the section shows us the length (height) and breadth of the vertical sur-
faces which confine movement and the vertical location of the plane(s).
Such a formulation reveals the absolute complimentarity of the two nota-
tion systems, considered as abstractions. But in terms of our actual
experience of the dimensions of space which plan and section represent,
the inversion of priorities in section which creates theoretical compli-
mentarity at the same time undermines any possibility of a complimentary
experiential significance. For, inasmuch as it is true that at any given
moment we experience but a single plane of movement, it is equally true that
we are aware of a multiplicity of vertical surfaces which confine movement
and contain space. For this reason alone a single section can never pre-
sent a space with the same conceptual clarity as a single plan. But the
difference runs deeper than this.
As we move through space, we are aware of the section of the space
changing in a way that the plan never does (or, at least, that we are never
aware of in the same way). For example, the plan of a longitudinal cathe-
dral with nave, transept, side aisles and central altar is customarily
flat, except at the crossing; in any case, the entire plane of movement can
be represented in the plan. The section above this datum is, however,
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quite varied: low vaults over the side aisles; higher vaults, perhaps
vaults of a different kind, over the central nave; a dome of yet another
height over the crossing, with yet another section in its pendentives; the
vaulting of the apse; and so on. To move through the church is to experi-
ence these changes in section (indeed, there are those who argue that it is
precisely this modulation of section that gives meaning to the space
(Arnheim (7), Souriau (42)). No one sectional image can, however, fully
represent these changes; the cut along any one line will invariably exclude
some. To the extent that we are familiar with the particular space repre-
sented, or even with the kind of space represented, we may well be able to
anticipate many or all of the successive changes and so "read" the whole
space from one section, but it cannot be represented in a single sectional
image.
The section is further distinguished from the plan in that it has a
specific orientation--the floor or ground is always the bottom of the image.
Hence, there is a visual equivalent for gravity and weight. Furthermore,
of the two dimensions presented (and the absent one which it partially
suggests), only the information of the vertical is complete. Thus any
section is--in a manner not true of plans--dependent on all other possible
sections; completeness of sectional information can be achieved only to
the extent that any section can be visualized in relation to all others.
The plan, to be sure, does not show all the variety of the space nor does
it fully explain its experiential qualities, but it does show everything
that can be shown in plan in one image.4
As we have noted above, the section, like the plan, collapses the space
it represents, offering no structural cues as to the presence of depth,
although these cues may be added. But this collapsing, too, has a different
significance in section than in plan, for the ambiguity which it creates
here concerns the possibility and the extent of our lateral movement through
the space (the limits of our movement into the space of the section, as it
were). Furthermore, because habitable space must be comprised of continuous
ground and discontinuous vertical surfaces, a representation in section will
almost invariably occlude the character of distant vertical surfaces behind
those that it represents. (In the example, the longitudinal section of the
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nave hides the pilasters on the walls behind the columns; in spaces of
less symmetrical regularity, the surfaces behind what is shown in the sec-
tion may give no cue as to what is behind it.) 5
There is yet another respect in which the section is an ambiguous
representation. Sections, like plans, are constructs of metric--that is
haptic and tactile--information; they relate to the visual world. But
unlike plans, sections have a curiously visual, or "aspectual," quality.
They don't look just like what we see of a space, yet they seem to resemble
something we think that we might see.6 Thus there is a tendency to deal
with sections as if they were purely visual information and a consequent,
albeit curious, sense in which the section may be taken to bridge, at least
in part, the gap between the thing as it looks and as it is. But it is
this very resemblance to the glance that makes the section, finally, less
significant as a representation; glances (aspects) areplural--they change
as we move and it is only the sum of many aspects which bears any full
relationship to, and has any power to evoke, our concept of space.
ELEVATION
Elevation may be considered as a special case of section, alike in
every regard as a notation system, but taking as its object only the exteri-
or of the building. For this reason, however, the elevation is not limited
by some of the shortcomings of the section. We are not primarily interes-
ted--in looking at an elevation--with what is located behind the surface
which is represented, but only with that surface itself. The elevation is
the image of the side or facade of the building and it is customary,
although by no means necessary, to "take" the elevation parallel to the side
of the building being shown. We tend to assume, therefore, that there are
as many elevations as there are discrete sides to the building--a limited
and self-apparent number--whereas, as outlined above, the number of signi-
ficant sections is by no means so limited, nor so apparent.
Elevation, like section, is ambiguous with respect to depth and offers
no cue by which a jog in plan may be immediately read although, as with
plan and section, a set of secondary devices may be added to give some
sense of this absent depth. Like section, too, elevation has a tendency to
be read as a view--that is, to closely resemble and hence come to stand
29
for something which we think we might see. However, somewhat paradoxically,
the elevation becomes a more potent image by this confusion. Elevation is
primarily a compositional device, drawn so as to compose (or discover, as
some design ideologies would have it) the form of the exterior surface--
the disposition of the functional and decorative elements in the plane of
closure. As such, it has a preeminently visual function, even though the
elevation per se does not correspond to any view of the facade we actually
see. But this ability to be taken for the "thing as seen" is, therefore,
especially appropriate. As a representation, and as a system, elevation
bears a close resemblance to the significance of the component of the
experience for which it stands as a surrogate.
The ambiguity of the elevation, its tendency to stand for a purely
visual image of the surface, seems to enhance its potency as a representa-
tion. Indeed, the principal elevation--most often the entrance facade--
may come in mind's eye to stand for the building as a whole. This is
clearly, and intentionally, the case for many buildings of the Renaissance
and for Gothic cathedrals, for example, but it is to a greater or lesser
extent true of all buildings. The act of entering constitutes, at some
point, the penetration of a surface and our image of that surface is likely
to stand, at least in part, for an understanding of the building per se.
The elevation may thus become closely correlated with the concept of the
space-the "formless and timeless invariants" of the visual world.
One other, associated respect in which an elevation closely resembles
a plan is the quality of its completeness as a figure standing against a
surround. The elevation reveals the vertical edge--the continuous peri-
meter of the built space in the other dimension--and so allows us to
visually understand its position with respect to other edges and the sin-
gular identity of the building as an independent form. The same recipro-
city of figure/ground that we cited as true of plan is true here, and this
may further add to the significance of the elevation as a representation.
Again--as with plan--the absent other sides, like the other floors, are
not experienced as, or read in the drawing as, incompletions; each drawn
elevation, as each drawn plan, is largely self-sufficient.
* * * * *
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The history of the orthogonal representations as generic types of
images would seem virtually impossible to trace.8 However, the history
of the development of a particular kind of plan--one which is complemen-
tary to, if not the sole precedent for, the use of plans in architectural
practice--has been documented. This is the kind of drawing which Pinto
has called the ichnographic city plan. 9
The development of the ichnographic plan must be seen in the context
of cartographic experimentation in the second half of the 15th century. Two
other kinds of city images predated its appearance in the western European
tradition: the iconic map and the view. The former were most often cir-
cular images in which a group of monuments were chosen to typify the city.
(The circular format is a characteristic which these medieval images share
with "world maps" and "heavenly maps," which date back to the 8th cen-
tury.)10 Indeed, the iconic map may be seen as a kind of local cosmo-
graphy, presenting the city as an idealized arrangement of symbolic ab-
stractions. It was the translation of this symbolic hierarchy onto the
page which was of greatest importance in these images: no systematic
representation of scale and distance--that .is, of real space--is to be
found.
The views, by contrast, were renderings of greater or less accuracy
of the city as seen from a single vantage point; sometimes a nearby moun-
tain or town, more often a fictive, celestial perch. The problems of
constructing such views were formidable. Even with the later adaption of
perspective technique, the intrinsic limitations of any view remained; the
various illusionistic devices which created the apparent spatial effect at
the same time confounded ai understanding of actual spatial relationships.
Even to the extent that such difficulties could be overcome, the view
remained a selective representation of purely visual information, an image
which corresponded with appearances.
It was, on the other hand, just such an understanding of actual spatial
relationships that the ichnographic city plan provided. One of the very
first was Leonardo's plan of Imola of 1502. What most concerns us here
is that such a drawing represented a complete departure from the logic and
conventions, as well as the substantive priorities, of the earlier images--
a wholly different kind of abstraction. This new plan was a visual con-
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struct based on metric rather than visual information which made a corres-
pondence with the physical reality of things and did so, moreover, by a
coherent systematization of the drawing process. This was a representa-
tion of the city from without rather than within and at the same time a
framework from which both the general layout and the configuration of its
12
component parts would be understood.1
PERSPECTIVE
Whereas plan, section and elevation are all "conceptual" systems--
representations of and constructed from the information of the visual
world--perspective is, above all, a visual or "aspectual" system. Its
referent is "pure" vision and its conventions are determined accordingly.
It is the antithesis of the three systems we have thus far presented.
A perspective is a view, an image of appearances. The lines on the
page are drawn in such a way as to exactly replicate the edges of the
planes and surfaces in the scene as it would appear from a fixed vantage
point. A perspective is a visual field and thus, unlike the orthogonal
images, the space of the perspective representation has a precise corres-
pondence with one position in the space outside of the image. It is this
point from which the image is made and from which, ideally, it is to be
seen. Thus, the position of the observer is known and fixed.13 The
perspective may thus be seen as a conditional explanation of visual spatial
relationships--"what things look like from here." It is in this condition
that both the great power and the great limitation of the system lie.
In the discussion of the orthogonal systems, the question of which
planes and surfaces of any given space are to be presented in an image is
answered by the rules of each system, without reference to the particular
space or image under consideration. Inclusion of more or less informa-
tion becomes therefore simply an issue of whether the plan, section, or
elevation is more or less complete. In perspective representations, how-
ever, how many planes and surfaces are to be shown and which particular
ones become questions to be answered less by an a priori set of rules about
perspective than by the selection of the point of view. A perspectival
image of a square interior may show five of the six space-defining surfaces
(floor, ceiling and three walls), whereas a perspective of the exterior of
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a building will show two exterior walls. Thus, the relative quantity of
information is a function of the vantage point, rather than--in the sense
it was before--an intrinsic limit of the notation system itself.
The primacy of vantage point affects the quantity of information in a
given perspective image in yet another way. Since the path of vision
follows a straight line, any point of view will set up juxtapositions of
planes and surfaces in which near objects will obstruct the sight of far
ones behind them. This much was, of course, equally true of sections and
the orthogonal systems generally. But since the perspective is but one of
an infinite number of possible perspectives and given the ability to select
a vantage point, we may accordingly select from among an infinite set of
of juxtapositions. If we want to represent the axial relationship of the
pilaster and the column which was impossible in section, we need only
choose a position oblique to their axis from which to make the perspective.
There is also a question of what was termed correspondence of the
drawing to its referent. We noted that plan, section and elevation are
all isomorphic to their referents with respect to measure and angle.
Clearly this is not the case with perspective. But we cannot so easily
formulate a rule for all perspectives to serve as counterpart to this iso-
morphism of orthogonal representations, because the degree of visual dis-
tortion (diminution of size with distance, apparent parallax of parallel
edges and so on) is itself a function of the position of the observer. For
any particular view, the relative distortion may easily be found and for
all possible perspective views the method of finding it is the same,
but the particular vantage point is the critical variable determining for
each representation the apparent measure and angle of the lines. Hence,
the making of the drawing becomes an implicit part of the drawing; the act
of representing is, in some sense, itself represented. It is in this
respect, finally, that perspective is most unlike the other notation
systems and most clearly an artifact of "pure" vision.14
The utility of perspective representations is, of course, in their
suggestion of "true" depth, the illusion of space. Perspectives are the
most immediately accessible of architectural drawings; they require no
special effort to read. The great visual power of the perspective image
proceeds from the fact that the coordinates which create its illusionistic
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space can be projected "out toward" the observer as well as "in away" from
him, so organizing all space in its logic of appearances. One correctly
drawn perspective becomes, in a sense, a visual representation of the
entire world.
Yet when we want to know "how things are," perspectives tell us much
less, though they are not altogether mute. As we observed in Section 1,
there are certain moments and certain positions in which the concept of
an object seems to be contained in a particular aspect. So, too, there
would seem to be certain perspective views which explain more--or rather,
in which more can be read--than others. For example, a bilaterally sym-
metrical building will appear so in a perspective if our point of view is
in line with the central axis. What occurs is a kind of visual recogni-
tion of symmetry: the two parts look identical and, given the location of
the vantage point, we know that they would only appear to be so if, in
fact, they were. But making such a visual inference--this act of recogni-
tion--depends once again on an understanding of our position in space with
respect to the scene. To verify such an inference we must, as before,
resort to other kinds of information and so, to other kinds of representa-
tions.
So far we have confined our discussion to what is strictly termed
linear perspective. This is the basic framework on which the images
generally called perspective are based: the principles of construction
which prescribe the angles and measures of lines and the regular diminu-
tion of apparent size of objects as they recede from our vantage. But
there are two other components of perspective vision which reinforce our
reading of depth in the perception of visual fields and are themselves the
basis of graphic techniques which may be used to clarify and enhance the
reading of depth in perspective images. There is the perspective of color
or light, whereby surfaces and objects at a greater distance appear to be
darker in tone and there is the perspective of resolution whereby surfaces
and objects at a distance reveal less quantity and clarity of detail. As
graphic devices, these rules (i.e., farther=darker and farther=vaguer) are
the equivalent for perspective of the depth devices we lister earlier for
the orthogonal systems.15
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* * * * *
In contrast to that of the orthogonal systems, so much has been writ-
ten on the history of the discovery (or as some whould have it, the inven-
tion) of perspective and its dissemination as a technique from the
Renaissance on that little purpose would be served by its repetition here.
Yet, a few remarks on events and theory surrounding its development will
help to clarify its significance as a notation system in architecture.
We have thus far not mentioned what is, in many ways, the most impor-
tant attribute of perspective as a notation system--that is, its basis in
mathematical relationships and therefore in "objective" fact. This was,
of course, the chief claim for the new system among its early propagandists
and the subtle minutia of that basis took the greater part of two centuries
to fully resolve. Perspective was, as in the title of W. M. Ivins' wonder-
ful essay, the rationalization of sight. Prior to its development, there
was a currency of realistic images, realistic in the sense that they
served as credible simulacra of the people, places and events which they
purported to describe. The significance of perspective was in the fact
that it systematized image-making and made its tenets and techniques a
logical extension of the laws which described other phenomena.16 Visually
"correct" images could thenceforth be directly, mathematically related to
their real, three-dimensional referents. Conversely--and more importantly
from the standpoint of making images-objects and settings could now be
understood in a way (seen in a way) which permitted their translation into
a particular, mathematically rigorous, representation.
Ivins credits this as the single most important occurrence in the his-
tory of the Renaissance (over, for example, the fall of Constantinople, the
discovery of the New World, the Reformation and the development of moveable
type and printing, to name but a few) and his argument is quite convincing.
He interprets the development of perspective as a manifestation of a shift
in modes of knowing the world which posed a new problem of translation, and
it is especially in this regard that his interpretation bears on our
discussion.
In examining the tradition of "space intuitions" prior to the
Renaissance, he summarizes Euclidean geometry: "...the origin of which
in tactile muscular intuition is shown by its nearly complete pre-occupation
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with metrical problems and its essential dependence upon congruence." The
dominance of the tactile-muscular intuition brought with it "...failure of
that geometry to take account of visual intuition."17 He illustrates the
limits of this single-intuition reasoning with the famous problem of paral-
lel lines: the returns of the two space intuitions are contradictory (by
sight the lines meet; by touch they don't). Perspective therefore :repre-
sents the substitution of a visual spact-intuition for a tactile-muscular
one made possible by the elaboration of "...the hitherto missing grammar
or rules for seeing both the logical relations within the system of sym-
bols employed and a reciprocal...metrical correspondence between pictorial
representations of objects and the shapes of those objects as located in
space."18 Description and representation were thus unified-the visual
19
world and the visual field shown to be a continuum.
It is important to emphasize that perspective imagery is based upon,
and constructed from, the same haptic and tactile sense returns which form
the basis of the orthogonal systems, but this metric information is used
to a different end. In perspective the metrical representation is implicit
but transformed in the final image; it is the means to making an immediate,
visual impression--an aspect. In the orthogonal systems, the metrical
representation is itself explicit--directly represented in the image--
while the visual impression is implied, but must be derived by a transla-
tion on the part of the viewer. (We shall expand on this notion of
complimentarity below.)
ISOMETRIC PROJECTION
The last notation system which we will consider is that of the class
of representations which may be called isometric projection. Called vari-
ously isometric, axonometric and plan oblique, these images all share the
basic characteristic of preserving scaled, dimensional relationships along
two or three of the axes. An image thus constructed creates the impression
of a three-dimensional reality by suggesting depth without, however, adop-
ting the compensating optical distortions of the scenographic perspective
system and at the same time allows for an "objective" scrutiny--that is,
a measurable one. It was this combination of visual illusion and metric
accuracy which was the impetus to the development of the system, and its
application to architecture. However, if isometric projection combines
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the seeming advantages of both orthogonal and perspectival systems, it also
lacks elements which are essential to each.
Despite the illusion of three-dimensional space--of depth--isometric
images are representations of the information of the visual world. They
correspond to no possible aspect for the reason that their construction
depends on no actual vantage point. Rather, as with orthogonal images, the
position of view is relative to a plane.20 And, as with plan, section and
elevation, the information of the isometric projections is the haptic and
tactile returns of perception, but only in part. In order to create the
illusion of depth, isometry sacrifices the isomorphism of angle which was
a cardinal virtue of the orthogonal aystems. With isometry, measure is
constant, but angle is distorted. Thus, circular apses become elliptical
segments, square columns take a diamond shape, and so on. This distortion
is systematic--that is, it can be translated to the real (i.e., plan)
formulation by a simply algorithm (but a curious one; angles drawn as
600, 90* and 1200 may all be equal to 90*, as in Choisy's drawings).
At the same time, isometric projections-like sections and perspec-
tives--obstruct some portions of the information by the representation of
others. This problem may be ellided if the building represented is bila-
terally symmetrical (as were so many of Choisy's examples); the observer
can mentally complete the rest of the space. But with asymmetrical and
irregular plans, isometric images become quite confusing. The observer
cannot so easily, or cannot at all, "complete the space." (This explains,
at least in part, the tendency of so many of the de Stijl images to look
as if they were all exterior surface, with an implied and apparent but
finally incomprehensible spatial depth.) Furthermore, unlike perspective
in which the occluded portions of space or surface could be logically
referred to actual appearance from a real position in space, the vagaries
of isometric images have no such visual explanation. The system imposes
restraints--which the draftsman may use to advantage--but there is no
a perceptual logic to guide his choice.
One final ambiguity which isometric projection poses is the relation-
ship of the image with respect to the page. As noted above, in the ortho-
gonal systems the page may be considered as a screen which corresponds to
an imaginary cut either parallel or perpendicular to the ground plane. In
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perspective representation, the page may be thought of as a screen which
stands in front of the viewer, perpendicular to his line of sight (Alberti
wrote of a veil of fine cloth which artists should imagine before them;
Durer's famous engravings of the artist and his model make the imagined
veil a literal piece of gridded glass). In isometric projection the page
has no such actual or imaginable correspondence to the space represented--
the image or, to be more precise, the spatial meaning of the image and the
surface upon which it is drawn, are discontinuous. (It is perhaps for
this reason that isometric representations so often seem to be floating
or ungrounded images.)
* * * * *
The history of isometric projection as a formal notation system is
an intriguing one. The essential principles were applied, with varying
degrees of precision, to problems in a wide range of fields--painting,
stonecutting, construction and engineering--before their application to
architectural problems, and the use of such images to which we are accus-
tomed today represents something of a blending of several traditions. 2 1
In architectural practice, there are instances of the use of illusionistic
representational systems which approach isometry dating back to the 16th
century in the drawings of Peruzzi and others active in the fabrica of
St. Peter's.2 2
What we know today as isometric drawing had its origins in the work
of Gaspard Monge, the 18th century mathematician who formulated the basis
for descriptive geometry.23 Monge was instrumental in founding the Ecole
Centrale des Travaux Publics of Paris in 1794, which was renamed Ecole
Polytechnique the following year. Its charge was not only the preparation
of students for all aspects of civil and military construction but, under
Monge's direction, the pursuit of the general, theoretical foundations of
all technological fields. 2 4
From its inceDtion, the Ecole included one professorship and several
courses of courses of instruction in architecture. Unlike the Ecole
Speciale de l'Architecture (the forerunner of the Ecole des Beaux Arts)--
in which theoretical issues in design, composition and history were empha-
sized--the program of the Polytechnique focussed on construction and the
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history of its techniques. This was exemplified in the treatises of one
of the best known of the Polytechnique's architects, Auguste Choisy.
Exactly one hundred years after Monge's Geometrie Descriptive, Choisy
published his two-volume L'Histoire de l'Architecture (1899), which
applied Monte's principles to the illustration of architectural space in
a methodical way for the first time. His text compares buildings of all
ages from the "prehistorique" to his own, with a central view to issues of
construction. It was as much this particular emphasis, we may suppose,
which recommended the use of isometric projection as the author's position
in the school which preserved the legacy of Monge's work. In an introduc-
tory note to volume 2, he comments that the system has "...the clarity of
perspective and lends itself to direct measurement."25 The visual per-
suasiveness and therefore the value of Choisy's system stem primarily
from the particular use to which he put it: his was above all an illus-
trative text intended to facilitate comparison of diverse building tech-
nique. The "abstract figuration of plan, section and elevation" which
he sought to supplant with images "as lively as the edifice itself" was,
of course, precisely the abstraction which, three centuries earlier,
Raffaello had proclaimed as essential to the architect's art. This juxta-
position of views points to the larger issue of the use of the notation
systems severally, in combination, superposition and succession. To this
issue we now turn.
* ~* * * *
We have suggested that isometric projection combines information
available in the orthogonal systems with some approximation of the charac-
teristics of "visual space" to be found in perspective. (It could be
argued that isometric representation could be derived from a progressive
distortion of the principles of perspective construction, along the lines
of the cavalier perspectives, discussed above.) Certainly as Choisy posed
it, isometry was a combination of plan section and elevation so contrived
as to produce illusionistic qualities. The components of each of the or-
thogonal systems were transformed in a way which preserved some essentials
of the information and yet made explicit the coordination of the separate
planes which had previously been hidden. Moreover, the method of combina-
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tion resulted (unlike the cavalier perspective) in a systematic means for
the construction of such images, one which was entirely independent of
viewpoint, actual or imaginary.
There is a sense in which perspective itself may also be regarded as
a combination, or superposition, of the orthogonal systems. In his criti-
cal analysis of Alberti's text, Ivins makes use of a simple, visual model--
a box-like "peep-show," similar to the sort which Alberti himself is
believed to have used in his famous demonstrations and which so amazed
his contemporaries.26 With the aid of this device, Ivins demonstrates
quite convincingly that the original formulation of perspective construc-
tion published by Alberti may be derived from the superposition of the
section (of the visual "cone of rays" from the fixed eye to the square in
plan) rotated 90 degrees onto the elevation (of the same cone of rays).
What is thus produced, without recourse to mathematical theory or the ab-
straction of vanishing points (which, as Ivins rightly points out, would
have made no sense at all a century and a half before Kepler's postulate
on parallel lines), is quite simply Alberti's first diagram by which the
square is thrown into a "correct projection." Thus it may be argued that
as the theory of perspective representation follows from a mathematical
manipulation of extant physical relationships, so too the mechanics of
the perspective notation follow from a manipulation of the orthogonal
systems which represent those relationships. 2 7
By a rather circuitous route, we have come back to the assertion which
we made in Section 1--that the visual world and the visual field were in
every sense reciprocal components of visual perception which could, under
particular circumstances, be directly cross-referenced and, indeed, substi-
tuted for each other. The systematization of perception has a precise
analogue in the systematization of representation. Ivins' unraveling of
perspective shows that the representation of an aspect (any aspect) is
indeed a process of transforming the information of the visual world and
its representations. So, too, once we have Alberti's formulation, we may
reverse the process and derive the haptic and tactile information components
from any aspect.
Such an interpretation of perspective also helps us to make sense of
several other kinds of images which combine different notations, especially
40
the so-called section-perspective. A section-perspective is a device used
primarily to explain the apparance of interior spatial relationships.2 8
Like the section, this kind of image represents the space as if bisected
by an imaginary vertical plane but with all space behind the plan rendered
in one-point perspective. Conversely, such images may be seen as full
perspective representations which have been "sliced" at some known
distance from the vantage point of the observer--the plan thus created at
that precise distance rendered in scaled (i.e., metrically accurate)
fashion.
Ostensibly such a combination of notations violates the logic and
conventions of each: the section as notation assumes the observer to be
at an unspecified (infinite) distance while the perspective, by definition
establishes the observer's precise vantage point. Visually, however, there
is no contradiction--the image appears to make sense. The reasons for this
are several. First, the two sets of notational conventions are working in
separate parts of the drawing, impinging upon one another only at the
interior edge of the section so there is no apparent (visual) contradiction.
Next, as we have observed before, the section has a curiously aspectual
quality, an ability to seem a plausible view of the thing as seen, and
this is exploited to advantage here. But most importantly, such an image
again attests to the interrelation of visual and tactile/haptic sense per-
ception and representation, for the perspective may be conceived as an
infinite number of parallel sections marching to the horizon's vanishing
point. At any given point, we may remove those before us to a certain
depth in the image; what remains will be a section-perspective, with a
"face" which can be accurately measured and an image of what is beyond
.29it.,2
With a discussion of the succession of images and its impact on the
understanding of architectural space, we turn from a consideration of how
the component parts of the space may be understood from discrete represen-
tations to the larger question of how a space may be understood in its
entirely from a particular set of images. We outlined in Section 1 a
theory which explains the processes by which we come to an understanding
of space on the basis of sense perceptions. Implicit in what we have said
in Section 2 is the idea that the representations we make of space must be
based on that same information of sense perceptions, and we have tried with
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each notation system to outline the ways in which those sense perceptions
are translated and structured into graphic images. With the question of
the impact of a particular succession of images on our understanding, we
must address the issue of what similarities there are between our under-
standing of space from our representations of it and our understanding as
based on our experience of it.
We have made several references to Raffaello's letter to Pope Leo X
of 1519 in which a particular view of drawing and of the appropriate use
of kinds of drawing was forcefully articulated, a view which we have said
has become the paradigm for an understanding of architectural space from
representations. What Raffaello prescribed, as Lotz explains, was the
systematic separation of plan, section and elevation, and their scaled
interrelation in the representation of architectural space.30 Implicit
in this view of orthogonal representations was a particular notion about
how architectural space should be understood and what set of representa-
tions was to be considered as complete.31 It also presented a very parti-
cular way of thinking about space in drawing (or "reasoning about space,"
to use Poincare's phrase) which was, we may suggest, altogether different
from the way in which we reason about space in our experience of it. Let
us pursue this contrast.
In our experience of space, we start with a series of aspects and
work toward a concept which embodies our cumulative understanding or
knowledge. We may call this process inductive--assembling fragments until,
either gradually or with a sudden start of realization, we understand the
space in its entirety (of course, we may in fact never reach that point for
a particular space). At that moment we can, in theory at least, create
for ourselves on the basis of our concept along an image of every possible
aspect of the space, even those which we have not yet experienced. We
know the space. (The particulars of this inductive process will vary with
each person's experience, but the form of the process--from fragments to
whole, from aspects to concept--will be the same.)
In coming to an understanding of space from representations of it,
we may in principle start with the counterpart to such aspects, i.e.
perspectives and mimic to some extent the inductive process we have just
described. After all, just as it specifies a vantage point, a perspective
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specifies a temporal position in an implicit succession of images or, more
precisely, a single temporal position which may be part of many possible
successions of images. But, in fact, we seldom follow this method in
dealing with representations.
The particular succession of interrelated representations specified
by Raffaello structures our knowledge of space in an altogether different
way, a process which might be called deductive. We confine our inspection
to the orthogonal systems. Customarily, we start with the plan which, as
we have observed, is in one sense an outline of the entire space--it
anticipates the concept, as it were. As we move to sections and elevations,
we may add new, even surprising information to our understanding, but it
is largely anticipated in the plan. However, the plan is itself an image
of information which could, in experience, only have been discovered from
a succession of views (aspects). It represents a portion of that same
composite information by which we inductively build concepts, but in a
completely new form--as a single image, seen simultaneously. Thus, the
process which is characterized in experience by a directed exploration in
time is here translated into an image which is immediately apparent. The
inductive process of correlating discrete aspects by which space is known
in experience is replaced by a deductive one in which images of composite
information, presented successively to view, must be conceptually inter-
related. 32
The point is a difficult and ambiguous one and it is perhaps best not
to hang too much on it. This much is clear: the processes of knowing
space in experience and knowing it in drawings are conceptually distinct;
both processes utilize similar information in particular temporal arrange-
ments but in very different ways.
* * * * *
Havings suggested some of the ways in which drawings may be combined,
it remains to discuss several concerns common in one guise or another to
all the notation systems we have examined which may be grouped under the
headings of scale, grid, and key. These devices, in each case, correlate
information which is technically outside the domain of the notation sys-
tem to the drawn representation. Together, they provide the framework by
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which information contained in one representation may be compared with or
transferred to another and, finally, the means by which the knowledge in
drawings may be extended to knowledge in its other forms.
SCALE
Scale has three aspects. It is first a means of relating dimensions
by a set ratio; a particular scale simply specifies that so many units
drawn shall stand for so many units as seen or built. Hence, it provides
a means of preserving proportional relationships while manipulating the
absolute size of the representation. Next, scale is a device for bringing
to bear on drawings what we know of numerical relationships in general.
Scale allows us, therefore, to express graphic equivalences as numerical
ones and so establishes a reciprocity between representational thinking
and numerical (arithmetical) thinking. Finally, scale permits the rela-
tion of drawn information to certain dimensional absolutes which, for any
of a variety of reasons, we may hold to be of significance. We shall look
briefly at each of these in turn.
Even if there were no other reason, architectural drawings would
utilize scale for sheer practicality; that a plan of a space drawn full
size would be unmanageable is too obvious to require discussion. Hence,
one benefit of scale is the potential to miniaturize and one benefit of
miniaturization is convenience: the absolute size of the image is reduced
to manageable proportions. But this convenience is not achieved without
consequences.
Though proportion be preserved, absolute size counts for something:
images alike in every detail save size do not, cannot, have the same sig-.
nificance. Levi-Strauss has remarked that the tendency to make the depic-
tion smaller than the object invites the viewer first to comprehend the
entirety of what is presented and only secondarily its components. (Mini-
aturization in this sense accomodates deductive thinking; we are given the
whole and surmise what we do of the parts in relation to that given.)33
The qualitative simplification produced by quantitative diminution of
which Levi-Strauss writes has an actual as well as a metaphorical truth.
Given a constant capacity of resolution, a smaller image must contain less
information than a larger one. This observation provides a kind of norma-
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tive axiom in looking at, and in making representations. The scale at
which the plan is made is taken to prescribe both the quantity of the
information included in the drawing, and the quality of its resolution (or
the completeness with which it is drawn). The four ways in which a plan
may be read which we outlined above correspond, in large measure, to
different levels of quality and quantity of information. (Indeed, some
portion of the plan may even get to be the full size of the detail which
it represents and thus become a template or pattern.) 3 4
In its second aspect, scale seems also at first blush a purely prag-
matic device: it is the formalization of measure. Having drawn a line to
scale we may find the measure of the surface which it represents and so
measuring the drawing becomes a way of measuring the space. Scale keeps
the laws of spatial relationship in the drawing constant with the laws of
spatial relationships in the visual world.
By using the "language" of numbers in drawings, however, scale also
provides us with numberical shorthands for describing spaces. The graphic
configuration which we see in plan may be formalized as an "x sq.ft. space."
The two are not, of course, strictly equivalent because the "x sq.ft.
space" may take an infinite number of actual configurations. But this is,
in a way, just the point. Scale allows us, for better or worse, to think
about space in the far more abstract terms of arithmetic and geometrical
relationships.
In this regard, also, scale has a strictly operational function. It
allows us to relate the separate representations of plan, section and ele-
vation to one another--to gauge, for example, equivalences in the openings
shown in each and so on. Often, we need only know that two drawings are
"to the same scale" (or even to different scales as long as we also know
what the ratio of the two scales is) in order to read the information of
each in terms of the other. This "reading" is a visual exercise, but it
is the numerical scale relationship which assists, indeed permits, it.
Finally, there is the question of dimensional absolutes. Regardless
of what all else we may read in a drawing, at some point we wish to know
how the space represented relates to our size. This, of course, may be
expressed in various ways from the specification of precise dimensions
based upon experimental analysis of human activity, to the elaboration of
45
dimensioning systems based upon proportions and ratios which have a parti-
cular significance.3 5
GRID
"Lack of scale," as Lotz wrote, "is a correlate of the perspective
construction; as we know, the section through the optical pyramid provides
no clue to the true dimensions so long as there are no human figures in
the picture."36 For this reason, our discussion of scale has been neces-
sarily confined to the orthogonal systems. We now turn to the considera-
tion of grid, a device which performs an equivalent function in perspec-
tive, but the ultimate significance of which is not confined to that end
alone.
Lotz might have added that a geometric surrogate for the human figure
would do nearly as well and it is indeed just this which Alberti's con-
struction of perspective provided for scaling perspective images, almost
inadvertently. The grid--a matrix of uniformly spaced perpendicular lines--
had a widespread use as a practical device in the transfer of cartoon
sketches for fresco and the execution of sculpture, perhaps even architec-
ture, in the early Renaissance.37 The presence of the grid was built into
Alberti's derivation of perspective construction.38 Whatever its source,
its consequence was that once the viewer could find any object in the image
the size of which could be determined (often a human figure), he could,
simply by judging the size relationship of that object to the grid, imme-
diately comprehend the dimensions of the entire space, as the grid was a
constant. If the image was accurately made, therefore, the measure of the
space could be taken.3 9
We have already mentioned Alberti's gridded veil and Durer's gridded
glass, which were the heuristic devices for the artist engaged in making
the perspective image. It may have been the notion of this imagined ver-
tical plane interposed between scene and eye which was the impetus to the
use of the grid on orthogonal images, or it may simply have been the result
of the kind of scaling process which Raffaello recommended for the prepara-
tion of such images in his letter of 1519, which amounts to laying out
a grid.40 However, once the grid was applied to plan and section, the
ability to translate between orthogonal and perspectival representations
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was provided with a visual shortcut. As long as the dimension of one
side of one square could be verified in each of the images, the represen-
tation of space in the visual field and the visual world was visually
reciprocal.
KEY
Finally, we turn to key or legend. A key is simply any device which
makes a translation of graphic information into written language. Thus
a key permits us to relate representational thought to verbal thought in
the same way that scale relates representational to numerical thought. At
its simplest level, this process amounts to the identification of the parts
of the image: we see some part of the space in plan, the key tells us
what it is called--a kind of formalization of labeling. The presumption
is that the written information underscores or may add to the information
we surmise directly from the graphic image.
It is interesting to note that key is customarily used with plan,
sometimes used with section, scarcely used with elevations and isometrics,
and almost never with perspectives. There is, it seems, a tendency to
make greater use of verbal information as the representation is less
immediately visual. This may perhaps be because verbal notions help to
provide substance to visual concepts which do not have an "aspectual"
character--but conversely, it seems more probable that verbal information
may intrude less, be more of a kind with visual material that is more con-
ceptual in nature.
As we suggested might be true of numerical thought with scale, so
too verbal thought may as much obstruct as enhance the information we under-
stand from the image itself. Verbal information defies the graphic con-
ventions of the notation system--which convey a visual sense of the
qualities of space--by substituting instead a verbal concept, a name.
Words may not speak louder than the images for which they serve as captions,
but they often speak more quickly and always in a different voice. To
the extent that seeing is a struggle to identify something (and our engage-
ment with architectural drawings an attempt to identify the space visually),
naming may preempt seeing; at least it will condition it. The grafting of
verbal to visual thought is a topic well beyond the scope of this essay,
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but we may suggest that the particular meaning of such combination for
architectural drawings is likely to be found in the resonances, or patterns
of association, which certain spatial concepts have in verbal, as opposed
to visual, representation.
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SECTION 2
Notes
1. The darkening of farther surfaces in section and elevation is an
adaption of perspective devices, as we shall see.
2. The authority of this conceptual organization is absolute; in plan,
for example, the occasional oblique surface (e.g., ramp or roof) is
rendered as a rectangle with its higher and lower edges seemingly in
the same plane. To accomodate the irregularities of natural terrain,
the plan uses the abstraction of contour lines which locate the hypo-
thetical intersection of the landscape surface with a series of ima-
ginary planes referenced to some arbitrary height.
3. This notion--plan as idea--has, of course, been explicitly proclaimed
during certain periods of architectural history (and at other times
as vigorously denounced). Its origins, however, I think run much
deeper; it is not simply fortuitous that our word plan has the double
meaning, also connoting strategy, design or idea; it is consistent in
its etymology through other languages to its Latin root "planus."
This association of diverse meanings reflects, I think, this same
quality of completeness as a representation of the realm of action.
4. It may be objected that in our example the plan would not reveal the
presence of the catacombs and crypt or of the walkways above the
aisles; again, these multiple plans do not constitute a part of our
momentary experience of the space as we stand before the transept,
whereas the multiple sections do.
5. There is, I believe, a particular habit of mind in looking at plans
and sections, explication of which may further characterize the
distinctions made here. There is a general tendency to read the third
dimension in both kinds of images by mentally "extruding" the image
given along the absent third axis. If this is true, there is generally
a much greater correspondence between the mental image thus created
and the fact when one extrudes the plan vertically than when one
extrudes the section horizontally. In most spaces (although certainly
not all), the mental exercise in plan will provide a fairly accurate
picture; we don't know from the image how high the space is or where,
for example, the vaulting may begin to constrict it, but this extruded
plan image will be accurate as far as the location of all the space-
bounding vertical surfaces is concerned. It approximates a passable
concept of the entire space, a working hypothesis to which subsequent
information can be added--the plan anticipates the concept. The
extruded section, and the section itself, achieve no such analogous
approximation.
6. We can, with only a slight effort, imagine the section from the
aspect--the glance; indeed, a section can often be drawn from a
single photograph.
49
7. This ambiguity between the elevation as drawn and the facade as seen
in actuality may itself become a part of the formal composition of the
building as a whole. In his text on Beaux Arts drawings, Drexler
describes a project of F. Duban, a Customs and Tollhouse of 1823. The
major approach was to the narrow end of a long hall which was to be
flanked some sixty feet or more behind by twin wings and some sixty
feet or more behind these, transected by a tall and very wide main
hall. The person approaching the entrance would have been aware of
a low masonry wall with a single entrance and, at some depth, a second
set of flanking walls--perhaps a vague impression, at some very
considerable depth-of the main hall. But in drawn elevation,
except for a shadow cast by the entry gate, the entire facade reads
as one wide, continuous surface with no dislocation in depth, thus
creating a singularly imposing aspect, all the elements integrated
on a truly monumental scale. Drexler writes: "...the visual diffi-
culty of indicating relative depths is actually incorporated into the
conception and used to generate its thematic development.....A model
or perspective would make the relationships easier to understand, but
would omit just those juxtapositions, fictitious but conceptually
decisive, that are inseparable from the language of elevation
drawings." Drexler (12), pp. 33-34 (emphasis added). We see here an
instance of the role that the conventions of the notation systems can
play in directing the elaboration of the design concept--a theme to
which we will return in the final section.
8. Because of the extent to which it accomodates abstraction and distor-
tion while still maintaining its essential character plan, for -
example, may be given a very broad interpretation. H. Pirenne writes
that the Egyptian hieroglyph for city was a kind of idealized plan
image; diagramatic plan-type representations of cosmographies may be
found in many cultures, dating back millenia. It would seem a hope-
less task to try to organize a hierarchy or find limits for the his-
torical use of the plan image per se.
9. Pinto (31); "ichnographic" is derived from the Greek for trace or
outline and writing; the use of the term as a rough synonym for
ground plan goes back to Vitruvius. See also Schulz (38).
10. Ibid., p. 36.
11. Ibid.; details of its construction and the tools wich which it was
made, pp. 38-43. See also Heydenreich (22).
12. Ibid., p. 50. (especially on the exigencies of Renaissance city design
and fortification which influenced this development.) The ichnographic
city plan by no means supplanted the production of views or of iconic
maps--indeed, its diffusion throughout Europe was relatively slow. The
Renaissance audience for these new plans was, in any case, a rather
select one: administrators, engineers and armies--the only audience
for whom a comprehensive image of the physical reality of the city
was a matter of vital importance. Schulz develops a somewhat
analogous interpretation of the material, but with a different cate-
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gorization--didactic v. geographical images. "Broadly speaking, the
known material can be divided into two categories. One consists of
maps and plans of a narrowly cartographic intent, the function of
which must have been simply to report geographical and topographical
facts. The other comprises maps and views with an ideal content,
material that must have had a didactic intent. Drawings of the
second group sometimes make use of data drawn from those of the first
and vice versa, so that cartographically these two groups are inter-
related, but in function they differ clearly." Schulz (38), p. 443.
Schulz is primarily concerned with the construction of view, especi-
ally the much celebrated one of Jacopo da Barbero, made of Venice
in 1500. It may be argued that it is in the view that the components
of all three kinds of drawing may most workably be combined: symbolic
relationships may be expressed both by the selection of vantage point
and by distorting somewhat the prominence of distant objects; so, too,
physical relationships may be generally inferred from a view provided
that important particulars are not obstructed. Hence, within the
reality of appearances, the reality of symbolic hierarchies and of
metric absolutes may be alluded to, if not decisively shown. For
this reason, the distinction between kinds of intent (i.e., didactic
or reportorial) is particularly appropriate to the discussion of
views.
13. This is particularly important when the image is intended to be a
highly illusionistic one--one which "looks real." Many of the early
perspective theorists prescribed the point from which their images
were to be viewed for such an effect. Alberti wrote, in this regard,
that no picture can resemble the truth if it is not seen from a certain
distance ("Cosa niunta dipinta mai parra alle vere, dove non sia
certa distantia a vederle." Delle Pittura, 1.3 as per Janitschek ed.
of original, quoted in Ivins (24),p.15.) See also Edgerton (14),
Gombrich (17), and White (47) on this point.
14. Once again, because the information which perspectives contain/encode
is completely different from that of the orthogonal systems. "The
puzzle of perspective is that it makes things look right by doing
them wrong," as Arnheim has put it. But the solution to this puzzle
is implicit in the terms of its statement: perspectives look--plans
do. Or, to put it a little less cryptically, perspectives encode
"pure" visual information and simultaneous grasping; orthogonal sys-
tems encode the composite information of the visual world and succes-
sive sampling. The "normal" mode of perception ("doing them right")
is the latter. Of course, just what is "right" in looks and dos may
itself sometimes be questioned. Arnheim includes a very instructive
illustration: a rectangular pond surrounded by trees of equal height,
equally spaced is shown in two representations--one perspectival, the
other a kind of "Egyptian" plan (the pond is in plan, the trees are
seen in elevation with their trunks correctly placed with respect
to the pond's edge). The modern Westerner and the ancient Egyptian
are asked to jusfity these images. The Westerner replies that the
perspective looks just like the scene, whereas the other image has
the trees "knocked over," pointing in four directions--some upright,
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some upside-down, etc.--and that the outline of the pond is seen as
if from the air. The Egyptian counters that, in his representation,
the pond is shown to be rectangular--as indeed it is--the trees are
evenly spaced and all of the same height--as indeed they are--whereas
in the perspective the pond is skewed, the trees are of different
heights and some are in the water, some outside, and some on top of
each other. Arnheim (6), p. 96.
15. Ironically, conventions used in the orthogonal systems are to some
extent derivative of the perspectival conventions: farther=vaguer
is often used on sections and often more distant surfaces are rendered
more darkly although strictly considered, this contravenes the basic
premise of the orthogonal systems which, as we have shown, are not
related to purely visual concerns at all. Edgerton documents a
similar confusion of graphic depth conventions in the history of
pre-perspectivai painting: space rendered in oblique, non-perspective
fashion was apparently thought to be made more realistic by the addi-
tion of "naturalistic" shading (Edgerton (14), p. 10). The use of
shadow in section and elevation to increase legibility of depth is
also in a sense a misappropriation of perspectival conventions: in
orthogonal images, the light no more than the observer can have a
real location with respect to the space represented. However, the
logical weakness of this mixing of conventions does not seem to under-
mine its visual effectiveness.
16. "A system of symbols without logical schemes, both for its inter-
relations and combinations within itself and, if it symbolizes exter-
nal fact, for its two-way, or reciprocal, correspondence with exter-
nal fact, is.. .of very limited usefulness. Ivins (24), p. 7. Per-
spective provided the systematic rationalization of that reciprocal
correspondence.
17. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
18. Ibid., p. 8. Kepler's statement of the mathematical proposition that
parallel lines meet at infinity 150 years later was, in Ivins'
view, "...recognition of an operational fact implicit in Alberti's
construction and r.epresented the final shift from tactile-motor to
visual schematization as it marks modern from classical geometry."
p. 10.
19. The extent to which Ivins' essay anticipates Gibson in its insistence
on the primary significance of tactile-muscular v. visual intuitions
in understanding systems of representation is remarkable. It may be
relevant to add here the thoughts of yet another writer, some 60
years before Gibson: "Thus representative space in its triple form--
visual, tactile, and motor--differs essentially from geometrical
space. It is neither homogenous nor isotropic; we cannot even say
that it is of three dimensions.... Our representations are only the
reproduction of our sensations; they cannot therefore be arranged in
the same framework--that is to say, in representative space. It is
also just as impossible to represent to ourselves external objects
52
in geometrical space, as it is impossible for a painter to paint on
a flat surface objects of three dimensions. Representative space is
only an image of geometrical space, an image deformed by a kind of
perspective, and we can only represent to ourselves objects by making
them obey the laws of this perspective. Thus, we do not represent
to ourselves external bodies in geometrical space, but we reason
about these bodies as if they were in geometrical space." Poincare
(33), pp. 56-57.
20. As Lotz has observed, isometric projection"...might be described as
perspective with an unlimited number of vantage points." Lotz (26),
p. 38. In the illustrations of Choisy, to which we will refer below,
the observer most often finds himself situated under the ground,
looking up through a removed floor into the vaults which were of
greatest interest. In the de Stijl use of axonometric, the observer
is customarily floating in the heavens, looking down.
21. Isometric-like images have a long tradition in pre-perspective pain-
ting, a non-rigorous use which may be termed crudely illusionistic
(cf. White (47) and Edgerton (14)). The principles of isometry may
have been used by the builders of the Gothic cathedrals in the cutting
of stone; this tradition was extensively refined in late Renaissance
and Baroque treatises on stereometry.
22. See Lotz (26). It was the problem of visualizing and executing an
enormous interior space which most clearly posed the limitations of
scientifically "correct," scenographic perspective; such experimenta-
tion sought to overcome these limits. Peruzzi's famous "ideal plan"
of St. Peter's of ca. 1515 is an example; the method employed was an
adaptation of a technique known as "cavalier perspective" or -bird's-
eye view," a bastardized perspective construction which utilized
multiple vantage and vanishing points which were not mathematically
coordinated. This earlier method may be traced to Filarete's trea-
tise of 1465 and had a subsequent tradition of use of its own in,
for example, the drawings of Serlio and particularly the later produc-
tion of city views--for example, the map of Rome undertaken by
Peruzzi's son in 1564. Lotz sees, in this extremely fecund period
of representational experiment, something of a struggle between the
positions of those whose background emphasized the problems of pain-
ting as opposed to architecture and construction at just that moment
when the two endeavors were for the first time being clearly distin-
guished as separate fields. It was, paradoxically in this regard,
Raffaello--preeminently a painter--who articulated the method of
representation thenceforth considered appropriate to architecture
which renounced all illusionistic systems in favor of separate,
metrically coordinated orthogonal images--plan, section and ele-
vation. On this we will say more below.
23. Monge developed the system while a student in military academy to
address complex problems in forticiation and ballistics, an alterna-
tive to the vastly more complicated analytic methods by which such
problems had customarily been solved. In later life, however, Monge
sought to establish his theory as a part of general mathematics, with-
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out reference to its many potential applications.
24. See Chafee in Drexler (12).
25. Quoted in Drexler (12), p. 18. The passage continues: "In this
system one single image, as lively and as animated as the edifice
itself, takes the place of abstract figuration, broken into plan,
section and elevation....The reader has under his eyes at one time
the plan, the exterior of the edifice, its section and its interior
dispositions." As Drexler observes, Choisy's method realy trades
one abstraction for another: "...his own being better suited to a
conception of architecture which would not have occurred to those
whose buildings he analyzes."
26. See Ivins (24), and Edgerton (14).
27. For the demonstration see Ivins (24), pp. 16-21.
28. Its use dates to the 15th century and its Renaissance development is
extensively documented in Lotz. Contemporary usage has extended the
device to exteriors as well.
29. Such a device could be used in many ingenious ways which retained a
visual credibility while defying sense: Lotz gives an example of
a drawing by Sangallo in which a section taken along the aisle of
a church outlines three chapels, the interior space of each of which
is rendered in separate, one-point perspective.
30. See Lotz (26). The letter concerns the representation of the archi-
tectural treasures of ancient Rome of which Raffaello had completed
an exhaustive survey. It was written during his tenure as master of
the fabbraca of St. Peter's, and it is Lotz's thesis that the view
enunciated in the letter influenced the preparation of drawings in
the fabbrica as well. The full text is to be found in V. Golzio,
Raffaello, pp. 82-92; parts of a translation are in Lotz (26).
31. A view distinctly different from that of Alberti, which had held sway
over a previous generation of practitioners with the injunction to
rely on ground plan and model alone, with occasional reference to
the "expedient" of perspective.
32. It would be tempting to suggest that orthogonal images in general and
plans in particular are concepts as far as representation goes, and
that we deduce the qualities of space from them. While such a formula-
tion may in fact describe some of the ways in which orthogonal repre-
sentations are used, as a generality it is too neat. Plans can in no
way be thought of as concepts; they are rather some intermediary from
which aspects may be deduced, but from which the real three-dimentional
concept must be worked back to.
33. Writing of models, Levi-Strauss continues, "...the smaller the totality
of the object, the less redoubtable it appears; by being quantitatively
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diminished it seems qualitatively simplified. More importantly, this.
quantitative transposition increases and diversified our power over
an analogue of the thing, by means of which the thing itself can be
taken hold of, weighed in the hand, comprehended with a single glance."
C. Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, quoted in Arnheim (7), p. 124.
The statement applies equally well to drawings; drawings are, in a
sense, less complete analogues than are models (although there are
models of many kinds); drawings, even more than models, seem to lend
themselves to "comprehension with a single glance." In a very dif-
ferent way, Bachelard has made an anologous point. Miniaturization
challenges the imagination; it invites the kind of "reverie" which
engages us--ourselves also imagined as miniaturized--in the space
represented. We see ourselves at once within the space and outside,
watching. It is as if the view of the whole defies the single glance
and presents a new possibility for reasoning and the desire to engage
the parts. "One might say that these houses in miniature are false
objects that possess a true psychological objectivity....Miniature
is one of the refuges of greatness." Bachelard (8), p. 148 and 155.
For Bachelard, the truth of miniature is a function of the larger
relationship between Representation and Imagination (his capitals),
in which absolute size plays a critical role. For both Levi-Strauss
and Bachelard, the notion of the power and omniscience of the obser-
ver in relation to the miniaturized environ is very strong.
34. The oft-repeated injunction to students of design to "jump scales"
or "take it up the scale" is a reflection of the assumption that
larger absolute size means the manipulation of quantitatively more,
and qualitatively different, issues.
35. In this regard, Alberti argued that the only actual dimensions that
the architect need specify were those of the principal measurements
(the "proportion" and "diviso") of the ground plan; all subsequent
dimensions, in every plane of the structure, had a purely geometrical
derivation. In his chapter on "the problem of harmonic proportion in
architecture," Wittcover cites the correspondence of the 18th century
architects F.M. Preti and T. Temenza. The former argued for the exis-
tence of an absolute set of universal ratios by which buildings should
be harmoniously design and regulated in all their parts. The latter
argued for the relatively of ratios on two grounds; first that the
eye was incapable of comprehending all three dimensions of space at
once and hence incapable of comprehending the ratios, second, that
all proportions in architecture should be judged from the angle of
vision at which the building is actually seen. Wittcover characterizes
this as a shift from the "objective truth of the building to the sub-
jective truth of the perceiving individual." Each of the disputants
claimed that his approach to proportion was the rational one. But
each of these truths may also be seen as a claim for one kind of
representation of design over another. Preti's position takes a con-
ception of architecture best expressed in orthogonal representations
(essentially a restatement of Raffaello's position). Temenza, on the
other hand, espouses a truth which depends upon a completely different
representation of architectural space, a perspectival one. There are
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continuous traditions to be found for each of these positions in
writing and practice back to the early Renaissance, following
Alberti's statement of a rudimentary theory of ratios in the four
books of Architecture. See Wittcover (49), pp. 102-154 and especially
146-147.
36. Lotz (26), p. 15.
37. See Edgerton (14), pp. 287-290.
38. See Ivins (24). Why Alberti chose a gridded square--checkerboard--
for his demonstration is open to speculation. These subdivisions
of the principal figure (Alberti writes that he wants to throw a
square into correct projection) serve as a check on the accuracy of
the diagonals in the first diagram so they may have been simply
auxiliary parts of the process. Alternately, Alberti may have
started, consciously or otherwise, with the problem which has so
long thwarted the efforts of painters: the correct rendering of a
floor surface of an interior, which was often tiled in a grid pattern.
39. "Whatever the configuration of a grid-divided surface, the observer
is able to comprehend all of its continuity as long as he can relate
to the side of at least one undistorted modular square which repre-
sents the true unit of measurement for judging the whole." Edgerton
(14, p. 287. Edgerton believes the development of the perspective
grid had an impact on what he called processes of "space structura-
tion" as a whole. He quotes a 15th century text of the Florentine
historian Gio. Cavalcanti: "Thus the eye is the ruler and compass
of distant regions and of longitudes and abstract lines. Everything
is comprehended under the geometric doctrine, and with the aid of
the arithmetic art, we see that there is a rule for measuring...
with the eye," in ibid, pp. 114-115.
40. Lotz (26), p. 21.
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SECTION 3
Thus far in our description of notation systems we have been con-
cerned with what kind of information is available in drawings, to what
kind of informationin the world it refers, and how it is structured--in
short, the points of correspondence between drawings and their referents.
Our discussion has been largely a comparative one, but comparison is a
relative endeavor and must finally be made specific to some purpose. The
relationship between things compared must be characterized actively, as it
were, with respect to the ends which the points of correspondence serve.
What we hope to provide in this section is a framework in which the
distinctions drawn between notation systems in Section 2 can be appraised
on the basis of the contexts for use of those systems. The differences
which we have described suggest certain intrinsic potentials and limits
in each system. We suspect that these potentials and limits condition
the appropriateness or effectiveness of each system in a given context.
But to make that point and thus further characterize the differences
between systems (and combinations of systems), we must first say something
about the possible contexts in which they may be used.
We have taken some care in the previous section to restrict the voca-
bulary which we have used in describing the particular notation systems,
especially the terms which describe what drawings do. We have for the
most part used terms which have broad and ambiguous meanings--for example,
"represent." But it will be instructive to consider, for a moment, some
of the other kinds of things that are said of drawings and particularly the
many other verbs used in speaking of (and thinking of) drawings for which
"represent" is a general substitute.
Drawings describe, they denote and depict; drawings resemble and
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"look like"; they display, portray and reflect; drawings identify; drawings
encode and organize; drawings conjure, "call forth," and envisage; drawings
instruct, they specify; above all, drawings show (hows and whats); and,
finally, drawings mean.
This is not idle semantics. Each of these verbs, and many others
besides, conditions the way we think about the simple statement, This is
a drawing of that. Each verb creates a very particular understanding of
the drawing, the referent and, above all, their relationship. Each verb
qualifies the correspondence of drawing and referent with respect to some
process. It is such processes about which we hope to say something in
this section.
We shall argue that there are four generic uses to which architectural
drawings are put. These are projection, specification, display, and por-
trayal. The first two--projection and specification--may be thought of
as generative; the second two--display and portrayal--may be thought of as
representative.1 We shall briefly describe this entire organization with
some general remarks and then present a more detailed exposition.
- Projection refers to all those uses of drawings by which spaces
imagined, conjured and dreamed are given form and developed.
Projective drawings may be said to be those which carry the
imagination forward.
- Specification refers to all those uses of drawings by which instruc-
tions are given about how a thing (object, building, space) is
made.
- Display refers to all those uses of drawings by which the images
projected (conjured, dreamed) are fixed and formalized, made into
distinct statements. Display drawings may be said to be those which
carry the imagination to the present.
- Portrayal refers to all those uses of drawings by which information
about things (objects, buildings, spaces) which exist is recorded and
presented. (They may explain how a thing has been made.)2
It will be useful to see these four generic uses as falling into two
general realms. The first may be called the design realm; it includes
projection and display. The second realm is harder to name; we will call
it "built" for the moment: included here are specification and portrayal.
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Grouped this way, we may observe that each of the generic uses in a realm
is complimentary to (or a reciprocal of) the other. Thus in the design
realm, display is a formalization of projection--a commitment to a decision
about an order of things which has been discovered in projection. Pro-
jection, in turn, is a development of new themes, ideas, elaborations on
the basis of the previous display. So, too, in the built realm. specifi-
cation and portrayal both have to do with the fit or match between drawing
and object: specification goes from drawing to object as, e.g., a working
drawing; portrayal goes from object to drawing as, e.g., a measured drawing
of an existing space.
The value of making such distinctions between the realms is that they
allow us to generalize the description of the generic uses with respect to
kinds of purposes or ends. For example, what we will say below about pro-
jection and display is based upon a particular way of thinking about pro-
cesses of design which will be described; identifying the two generic
uses--projection and display--as constituent parts of the design process
will, we hope, clarify that description. Similarly for specification and
portrayal as parts of the built realm. 3
* * * * *
We shall now elaborate the definitions of each of the four generic
uses of drawings. We are describing drawings here with respect to pro-
cesses. What this means in a general way is that drawings play a role in
a set of actions of a particular sort; the role includes supplying certain
kinds of information which are needed in the process, allowing certain
kinds of questions to be posed, and providing answers of a kind appropriate
to the actions to be taken. So, in trying to describe how drawings in
general would accord with each of the generic uses, we shall describe
what kinds of actions in the process would make use of the drawing, what
kinds of questions it would pose and what kinds of answers it would give.
We shall try to abstract prime criteria for the drawings--that is, state-
ments which characterize how the drawing must perform--and we will list
some examples.
SPECIFICATION
As we have said, this is any drawing which directs the production of
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its referent; the drawing must accord with the thing in every respect
which concerns its manufacture; it must also fit the manufacture--i.e.,
have an appropriate place in the particular scheme of making. Its conven-
tions must be shared or readily graspable by all those involved in the pro-
duction process. Hence, if the maker understands and can carry out all
the actions which are involved in making the thing, then the role of the
drawing is to specify the precise end of each of those actions or steps and
provide a basis for judging if the step has been correctly performed. Thus
the drawing will "answer" questions of the sort, I know that this needs
to be fastened to that; where should the connection be made, how should
the connectors be fastened?, etc. The test of this ability to direct
action is in the resemblance of the thing made to the image specified.
Thus the question of significant detail is very important. Resemblance
will likely be broken down into the resemblance of successive states in
the completion of the object. Drawing(s) must highlight each step and
provide straightforward, easily recognized checks on successive states;
image must not be open to much misreading (and should also perhaps point to
likely mistakes or anticipate trouble-signs in some way). The efficacy
of such images is very much tied to us.ers' familiarity with the processes
at hand. Examples include working drawings, model-airplane kit instruc-
tions, repair manuals of all sorts, gadget assembly instructions, etc.
PORTRAYAL
Portrayals are of two sorts: a kind of drawing which records a
place, "shows us what it looks like"--i.e. creates visual expectations on
the part of the viewer which will accord with the space represented; there-
fore answers questions of the sort (and to varying levels of detail), If
I'm standing here, what will I see of the space? or If I move around or
measure the space, what proportions or juxtapositions of elements, etc.,
would I find? Alternately, the drawing may stand for the space in a com-
pletely separate context of ideas or images, comparison of church plans in
an architectural history seminar, for example. In the latter case, we are
not interested in the drawing's accord with visual expectations vis-a-vis
the place, but rather the extent to which the drawing adequately repre-
sents (stands as a credible surrogate for) the space in terms of the sali-
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ent feature or idea being described. In the first case, the drawing must
be readable in a way analogous to the space; in the second, the image must
not be open to misreading on the salient feature, but otherwise is quite
flexible. The most important criterion by which portrayals are judged
is the quantity and accuracy of information. Examples: illustrations in
texts, travellers' sketchbooks, painters' life-studies, drawn (or photo-
graphed) project presentations in architectural periodicals, etc.
PROJECTION
A kind of drawing which gropes toward the form of a thing--which can
express the essentials of formal and functional relationships-- and comes
therefore, as close to some image of the concept of a space as possible.
In general, projections must pose and answer questions which characterize
the design process, which have a general form of, What if x, then ab,c,...
and some evaluation--for example, If what I want to do here is something
like this, what will it look like, be like, etc? and What are the conse-
quences of doing that? The drawings must facilitate thinking, imagining,
dreaming and yet still pose images about which normative judgements can be
made at some point; must be open to multiple, even conflicting, readings--
"richness"; must abstract and simultaneously present diverse kinds of
information--must be "information-dense"; detail is not a prime consideration;
conventions need not be shared beyond designer(s). Examples: sketches,
scratches, doodles on trace, etc.
DISPLAY
A display is a kind of drawing which formalizes a set of projected
relationships, and hence culls the essential elements from the projection
and displays them as a new problem statement/point of departure for pro-
jection--the next set of what-ifs. Responds to questions of the sort,
Having decided to do this and that, what does it mean in terms of (all the
relevant elements being manipulated at the moment)? Thus a display must
achieve a balance between a sensitivity to the richness of the previous
projection and the clarity and "objectivity" (or "degree of fixedness")
required to facilitate a new direction of thinking. Examples: site plans,
preliminary designs, "design development" drawings, etc.
* * * *
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In the remaining part of this section, we shall try to outline a
discussion of the design realm so as to provide the context for the uses
of drawings we have called projection and display.4
The underlying notion is that design is a sequence of metaphorical
.5
transformations of representations of a given realit 5 Schon sees the
design process as an exercise in language--that is, a combined verbal and
graphic "language game" between the designer and others and, even more
importantly, the designer and himself. The dialogue is an iterative one
which arranges a series of statements, queries, consequences and judgements
so as to produce new statements, queries, consequences and judgements
until a preferred state is achieved. Effective designing involves finding
effective and efficient strategies for producing such dialogues. We shall
argue for the primacy of representations in this process.
Let us examine this process in greater detail. There exists for
every design problem a set of relevant issues or "normative design
domains." These include, for example, siting, program/use, technology,
form, cost, precedent and so on.6 Some of these domains will be relevant
to every kind of architectural design problem; others may be specific to
a very few. For every problem, however, such a set will be articulated.
Each domain separately brings certain criteria to bear on the problem;
the interaction or interrelation of domains produces still others. Judge-
ments about the steps in designing will be made on the basis of these nor-
mative criteria.
The particular set of domains and the criteria which follow from them
reflect, in every case, the specifics of the problem as defined and the
priorities which the particular designer chooses to emphasize in working
on it. Thus, for the same problem some designers may give great conse-
quence to issues of very little concern to others. The criteria have
implications for each move that the designer may choose to make and every
decision will be evaluated in terms of them. The process of decision and
evaluation sets up a discipline--a logic of consequences and priorities--
by which the designer chooses to be bound.8
The action of designing consists in what Schon calls a series of
"thought experiments." These are, as we shall see, very much drawn experi-
ments. The action takes the following general form:
- A statement is made about the problem. It is (provisionally)
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accepted as a given.
- A proposition (or "what-if") is made with respect to the statement.
This represents a potential design move.
- The implications of the proposition are studied for each relevant
domain. Groups of such implications are seen as consequences
("thens") of the potential move.
- The proposition, with its implications and consequences, is eva-
luated in terms of the criteria which pertain to each relevant
domain.
These three steps may be repeated several times, as there may be many
feasible propositions for any provisional statement; the competent designer
may have to hold many such parallel chains of propositions, implications
and evaluations simultaneously in mind.
At some point, for A variety of reasons, a judgement is made and
the designer chooses one proposition, its associated implications and con-
sequences. (Schon calls this a conversion from the "what-if" stance to a
"stance of commitment.") The move thus selected is then represented as
a new statement (i.e., a transformation of the previous statement) and be-
comes the basis for the next set of propositions. (Schon calls the
selected moves "nodes for further designing"; their implications become
9
binding on subsequent moves. Thus is design seen as a transformation of
representations of reality.
The representations are most often drawings and, insofar as the pro-
cess is a drawn one, the generic uses which we have outlined above are its
fundamental parts. The statement with which the process begins may be
either a portrayal or a display. (At the outset of the process the drawing
is likely to be a representation of existing conditions--for example, the
site; this is a portrayal. Alternately, a designer might statt with some
schematization of functional relationships, either based on precedent or
on some prior analysis of the problem at hand. This would be, in our
terms, a display.) The set of propositions which ensues is part of pro-
jective drawing; each "what-if" explores some rearrangement of the drawn
elements of the statements (portrayal or display). Each such exploration
recasts the elements so that an evaluation may be made. Drawing after (or
on top of) drawing will be made until the designer is prepared to take
a "stance of commitment." At that moment, a new drawing is made
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which formalizes the results of the exploration. This drawing is a dis-
play; it becomes a new statement, and so the process begins again.
This transformation process may be characterized by its use of meta-
phors (what Schon calls "generative metaphors"). These are families of
familiar ideas which contain implicit normative stances which the designer
may invoke when confronted with an unfamiliar situation. Metaphors are
simple notions which stand for complex relationships between ideas and it
is this aspect of complexity in simple form which makes them powerful as
parts of the design process. The imposition of a metaphor on a design
problem recasts the elements of a new situation so that they accord with
a familiar one; in this manner the new situation becomes amenable to the
normative criteria which are implicit in the metaphor. Indeed, the meta-
phor may be seen as a distillation, a succinct encapsulization of a parti-
cular hierarchy of relationships between design domains. The metaphor
suggests both a way of conceptualizing the problem and a set of possible
paths toward its solution. Thus, it provides a way of guiding the explora-
tion which we have described above, of seeing how the given representation
will respond to moves of various kinds. 1 0
When we say that an unfamiliar situation is described in terms that
are true of a familiar one, what actually happens is that we treat the
representation of the problem as if certain familiar relationships--rela-
tionships true of the representations of another situation--were true here.
To put it more emphatically, we make representations of the new situation
as if it were (like) the familiar one. Metaphors, then, direct the produc-
tion of representations--the making of drawings.
This raises several interrelated questions. Where do the particular
metaphors used in design come from? What are the characteristics of a
representation which allow it to be influenced by metaphor? What forms do
metaphors take? Most fundamentally, from whence this potential for meta-
phor; what aspect of the design process itself allows for or invites
metaphors?
The potential for metaphor is intrinsic to the means of representation.
In the definition of metaphor in a very old Webster's, the example "the
ship plows the sea" is given. This metaphor in written language has nothing
to do with the possibility of taking ships out of water or of actually
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seeing oceans filled with earth (although it may conjure these as images).
The metaphor is an aspect of the rules of sentence structure which allow
us to combine the subject "ship" with the verb "plows" in describing its
relationship to its direct object "sea." To be sure, the content of the
metaphor is significant, especially in appraising its quality: "the ship
punches the sea" is a weaker metaphor; "the ship whistles the sea" is
obscure and nonsensical, but both are metaphors nonetheless. The potential
for metaphor is in the structure of the sentence. We shall argue that just
as the literary metaphor is intrinsic to the structure of verbal notation,
so metaphors in design are intrinsic to the structure of drawn notation.
What are the sources for particular metaphors in the design process?
In his discussion of social services, Schon cites two sources: particular
metaphors exist in the language generally (he calls this a "semantic"
source) and particular metaphors exist in the practice (he calls this a
source which draws on the "sociology of ideas").
By the semantic source is intended all verbal language. Schon intro-
duces the metaphor of fragmentation in his discussion of service delivery
(as in "social services are fragmented; policy must be devised to make them
whole again"). The semantic source for the metaphor is in our habituation
to describing all kinds of things--from broken china dishes to the plots
of bad movies--as fragmented. In this sense, fragmentation is "in the
language."
The second source reflects ideas in good currency in the field--in
Schon's example, social policy analysis. In the instance of service deli-
very being described as fragmented, the use of the metaphor reflects the
history of individuals and movements which have taken a particular view
toward social reform. Thus, "an inquirer may find himself thinking of
fragmentation and coordination when he thinks of service delivery, without
knowing how he came to do so, because that metaphor has become powerful
for thought and action in the special society of which he is a part." 1
We would suggest that the second source may be seen as a refinement
of the first. The metaphor which is powerful in the special society of
which the policy analyst is a part is simply a particular historical usage
of the language in a special way. In other words, the metaphor of frag-
mentation in the general language has as well a particular pattern of usage
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and associations in social policy studies. To apply the metaphor to a
particular problem in social policy analysis then may reflect the general
language use of the metaphor or the particular society's use of the lan-
guage (and, most likely, both).
Certainly this is the case in architectural design. Architecture
too makes use of the fragmentation metaphor. Buildings, users' needs,
programs, even sites may be described as fragmented. As before, the usage
in part reflects the use in the general language (our habituation to
speaking of things other physical objects as fragmented). But the use
of the metaphor in an architectural discussion would also reflect values
specific to factions within "architectural society" (there are those for
whom fragmentation is a term of utmost derision and those for whom it is,
in some sense, the desired end of design). To describe a particular build-
ing as fragmented is, knowingly or otherwise, to stand in one of several
historical campes and with or against one of several contemporary design
ideologies. Thus, we shall argue that the source of metaphor in architec-
tural design is simply in the language, both general and architectural.
Let us examine a particular metaphor from architectural practice.
"The house is a machine to live in"--LeCorbusier's famed dictum of 1923--
has been one of the most variously interpreted metaphors in modern archi-
tecture. First, the statement is rather sweeping and not without a certain
ambiguity: the house, not this house or any particular house, but the
house in general, the archetypal house, all houses are machines to live in.
But this was no more true in 1923 than it is today; we know from the con-
text in which the statement appeared that it carried an implicit prescrip-
tive sense: all houses should be machines to live in. What might such a
statement be taken to mean?
At the level of all houses (or all future houses to be built) the
metaphor may prescribe a way in which houses should be made (i.e., more
like machines are made), or perhaps that house manufacture should utilize
more machine processes; it may also prescribe something about how houses
are to be used. Thus the metaphor may affect ideas about the production
of houses.
At the level of a house as a building type, the metaphor suggests
that living should be accomodated by houses as, for example, movement is
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by automobiles or wheat threshing by a harvester. Such an interpretation
suggests a very particular way of looking at living, an analysis which
clarifies a hierarchy of related functions which the house should accomo-
date and optimize. Thus, the metaphor may affect ideas about the signifi-
cant elements of habitation.
At the level of a particular house or part of a house, the metaphor
may be taken to suggest that houses as objects should be more machine-like
in actual design--that, for example, the details of furnishings ought to
be articulated in a way which connotes machinery (either by literal
resemblance or by qualitative association--e.g., streamlined, stripped
of ornament, functional, etc.). Thus, the metaphor may affect ideas about
aesthetics of the decor of houses.1 2
These are but three of the many ways in which LeCorbusier's metaphor
can (and indeed has) been construed. A powerful metaphor will thus have
an application to the problem at several scales, from the organization of
our thinking about the problem as a whole in its broadcast context down to
the consideration of its smallest parts. (It may be salutary or disastrous
to actually apply a single metaphor to every scale of the design problem;
the point is only that potent metaphors are those which are not restricted
a priori to a particular level of the design process.)
From a machine to live in it is but a short step to "mechanical" and
"mechanistic" and in turn a whole set of metaphorical adjectives which
become evaluative design terms. The operative metaphor is thus elaborated
into a group of affiliated concepts which allow us to organize our thinking
not only about the object of design (i.e., the house), but also about as-
pects of the process which produces it (as in, The process is "too mechanis-
tic"--i.e., not sufficiently responsive to non-rational considerations--or
Should be "more streamlined"--i.e., strictly reasoned and causally expli-
cit). In time, we may come to see the metaphor not simply as a view of
houses but of design itself.
What of the form of metaphors? In literature, the expression of
metaphor is a written array of words; in social policy--indeed, in most
fields--the expression of metaphor is written language. (The consequences
of metaphor may have non-written results; in Schon's example, the new
policy may be to place all the offices of the services physically under
one roof, but the only way that a social policy analyst can express the
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metaphor of fragmentation is in written language.) So, too, architecture
may make use of written language. However, in architecture metaphor has
another and quite different expression: metaphors are expressed in
drawings.
To return to the house as machine example, the metaphor may influence
the representations which are made of the house in several ways. The
details of the house may be drawn so as to emphasize the component parts
and the steps of their assembly. The metaphor may influence the style of
drawing in, for example, the degree of precision and uniformity in lines
and the choice of medium (e.g., ink as opposed to pencil and wash). Values
implicit in the machine metaphor may be transposed to the representations
themselves and we may prize clear, reductionist images with a look of
elegance and efficiency. The metaphor may even influence the choice of
notation systems in which the building is portrayed in presentation
drawings. 1 3
But these are relatively superficial influences. The strong meta-
phor will have a much more profound impact on the development of the
design itself, an influence made manifest in the impact it has on the
representations which are part of the design process, especially that
portion of the process we have called projection. Here a wide variety
of things may happen: the initial display may be modified by additions
and deletions, prominent elements may be softened or further articulated,
entire sections of the image may be rearranged, whole new figures may be
introduced and juxtaposed, and so on.14
It seems that there are two general ways in which a particular meta-
phor could come to play a normative role in this projective phase. First,
we may imagine a point at which the representations are sufficiently
"soft" and ambiguous that a multiplicity of readings may be imposed. At
such a point, a metaphor from the general language may "occur" or "be
discovered" in the drawing as a means of organizing further representation
along some explicit line. The structure of the metaphor galvanizes the
drawing as it were, making clear which elements need to be fixed, which
eliminated and what the direction of further development might be. (The
description of this "occurrence" would be an exercise in the psychology
of invention and discovery; we won't attempt such an explanation.) This
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might be called the realization of a metaphor.
Alternately, a metaphor may be consciously selected. We may imagine
another representation, one in which a great deal is fixed and clear at
a given moment, and a particular reading is beginning to emerge. A designer
may then deliberately turn to a metaphor which is contained in another
example, making a selection from architectural precedents on the basis of
certain similarities between the representation at hand and the historical
example. This may take the form of a matching procedure in which it is
now the "hard" and explicit elements of the display which guide the imposi-
tion of a metaphor. Also, in this instance it would seem that the metaphor
would more likely be taken from the architectural language--that is, that
it would have an extant exemplar in another representation (a portrayal
of another building, for example).
If these are plausible options, we might further suggest that in the
second, the group of available metaphors, or range of attachable ideas,
is more likely to be a function of the particular notation system in which
the representation is made--that is, the matching procedure (or however it
might best be described) would operate on the basis of similarity of images.
Hence, projection made in plan might be associated with metaphorical pre-
cedents represented in plan.
But this may go too far. In order to study such possibilities further,
we would now have to look at another set of questions. What influences
do the conventions and logic of particular notation systems exert on the
representation of particular metaphors? Are some classes of metaphor more
vividly "seen" in some notation systems? (Is the machine metaphor especi-
ally conducive to axonometric expression, for example?) Conversely, does
a particular metaphor cast the logic and conventions of the notation system
in a certain light and thus direct the form in which the next display of
the problem statement is made? Or perhaps in a given design endeavor (or
a given designer's oeuvre) kinds of drawings and classes of metaphors.
become so closely associated in practice that the threads which we have
tried to disentangle become indistinguishable. And, if so, do certain
ways of drawing take on an implicit metaphorical content? Do certain
metaphors come to dictate the use of certain notation systems and thus
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the production of an increasingly refined and narrow group of representa-
tions?
These are the kinds of questions which future inquiry must address.
We have probably long ere now overrun the limits of a speculation such as
the present work. But in concluding this section, we may perhaps take a
step back and simply point again to those elements which, it seems, would
have to be the subject of any further examination of the processes we have
tried to describe.
There are three significant components in the action of design, parti-
cularly in the phase of projection. One is the information of the prob-
lem statement; one is the notation system and the conventions and logic of
the particular system in which the problem statement is represented; and
one is the metaphor. These terms are co-equal; each contributes its influ-
ence to the process of design. Each influences the others--indeed, together
they form a kind of knot of influences within which three cross-influences
may be discerned. There is the interrelation of the notation system and
the information of the problem; of the information with the metaphor; and
of the metaphor with the notation. Of the first we have said something
in Sections 1 and 2. Of the second, we have tried to suggest something
in this section. The third, in some ways the most important, we will
leave for a section yet to be written.
* * * * *
For the most part, we are accustomed to dealing with images as if
they possessed some of the qualities of their referents; this has been
called the efficacy of images. Thus we examine architectural drawings
in the conviction that from them we will ascertain some understanding of
the real relationships of things in space. The greater part of this essay
has been concerned with describing the details of this efficacy, the kinds
of correspondence or veridicality that a given image may make with its
referent. Indeed, we have tried to characterize whole notation systems
on the basis of the classes of correspondence they structure by virtue
of their logic and conventions.
Yet finally, all images are also independent statements which pre-
scribe how a set of things ought to be seen. Architectural drawings are
acts of visual exhortation and persuasion; they establish associations
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between ideas and things, and they do so as much by what they conceal as
reveal. Each drawing becomes a set of instructions which tells us what
to look for and how to see it. The significance of this prescriptive or
editorial component of architectural images is at least as strong as their
actual veridicality, for it reverses the standard notion of their efficacy.
Thus, instead of seeking the qualities of the real in the image, we come
to attribute the qualities of the image to the real.
There is, then, an inherent tension between the image as record and
the image as statement--between the dictates of the thing seen and those
of the way of seeing. To the extent that representation in architecture
is the creation of an equivalent or surrogate which stands for its referent
in a particular context, this tension must be evident. Each individual
image resolves the tension between these poles and each notation system
commends some general method for its resolution. But the tension itself
lies at the heart of thinking about drawing and thinking about design.
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SECTION 3
Notes
1. By representative, here, we intend something rather more specific
than the way in which we have used the term thus far, which we will
try to clarify below.
2. Display and portrayal are terms introduced to distinguish between
two kinds of depiction in M. Black's essay in Gombrich et al. (19).
As Black presents it, portrayal is the depiction of actual events,
persons, places, etc. (e.g., Washington crossing the Delaware);
display, on the other hand, is the depiction of imagined or fictitious
events, persons, etc. (e.g., Orpheus crossing the Styx).
3. The reader may observe that what we have outlined here is really a
2 x 2 matrix of the form:
categories
generative representative
realms
design projection display
built specification portrayal
This demonstrates that the reciprocities we have described within
domains are symmetrical--that is, specification :portrayal as projec-
tion : display. We hesitate to make use of such a matrix in the
text; it is a bit too neat, and the form of the matrix itself lends
an authority to the distinctions which we are not convinced that
they merit. As soon as the distinction between realms is made, it
must be qualified, for the facts that we hope to explain by it groan
as we force them into one slot or the other., The names of the
realms are not altogether satisfactory; indeed, the very separation
that two realms implies is misleading, for at some moments they must
be seen as ends of a continuum. For example, a project which is
designed and subsequently built: there is a moment in which the
last display (formalization of projection) in the design realm must
become a specification in the built realm in order for the project
to be realized. Similarly, the projection process must start with
something, as we conceive it. This may be a previous display of some
sort, but it often takes the form of some representation of existing
consitions--of a site, for example--and this, then, is a portrayal.
So it may be well to hold in mind another figure, with as much author-
ity as the matrix:
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projection
portrayal display
specification
with the possibility of a continuous, circular interconnectedness
which may, in theory at least, commence at any state. We raise
these qualifications here because the classification on which these
figures are based are themselves difficult and not altogether satis-
factory. In so doing, we hope to warn the reader (if, indeed, he
needs any warning) to treat with skepticism the generalizations
which follow.
4. We shall make extensive reference to two unpublished manuscripts
by D.A. Schon (36,37). The former is an analysis of a "protocol"
from a survey study of architecture curricula; it develops a commen-
tary on two design "crits" of student work, which are presented as
transcripts of the conversation between student and professor, as
well as some tentative interpretive remarks on the nature of the
design process as it can be generalized from these particular
instances. The earlier piece is a discussion of the design process
in its most general sense. It begins with a critique of the writings
of several design theorists (Simon and Alexander, among others) and
proceeds to a presentation of a substantially different formulation.
Specific illustrations are drawn from the design of service delivery
systems as an aspect of Social Policy Planning.
5. This statement builds on a definition first advanced in Simon (40).
Simon considers all design primarily in terms of problem-solving;
solving a problem, in its most basic sense, is taken to mean repre-
senting it so as to make the solution "transparent" (see page 77
and note #16). Architectural design neither can nor should be re-
duced to Simon's problem solving terms, but the role of representa-
tion of problem statements is nonetheless crucial. The value of
Schon's thesis is that it begins to examine the role of representa-
tions in design problems for which single--i.e., "correct"--solutions,
or even single classes of solutions, may not be appropriate.
6. The phrase, normative design domain, is Schon's; he defines these as
"...groupings of terms which describe elements, features and rela-
tions of design phenomena."((37), p. 10). For the particular protocol
which Schon is analyzing, he lists 12 design domains, p. 11.
7. Here lies part of the basis of styles, schools and movements--the
relative priorities which individuals or groups of designers assign
to relations between domains in addressing a problem. Of course,
such priorities often have an influence on the problem statement per
se, so the notion of identical problems is itself problematic.
This is, however, a minor point in the present discussion.
8. Thus, designing involves a continuing interaction between the
designer's free choice of moves, on the one hand and, on the other,
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the discipline set up by the implications of his moves... .But the
designer does not know the meaning of his moves until he discovers
their consequences (including their implications) across the range
of normative domains."(37) pp. 13-14.
9. Schon presents the model we have summarized here (37) pp. 10-15 and,
in greater elaboration, pp. 51-65.
10. "The generative metaphor provides a selective representation of the
new situation and a set of values for its transformation. The repre-
sentation permits investigation of the ways in which the situation
would respond to various interventions. The values for transforma-
tion set the criteria for the direction of intervention." (36) p. 34.
11. Ibid., p. 41.
12. The metaphor may be taken very literally on a grand scale which
combines all of the levels we have raised, as in Archigram's walking
city, in which all houses become a machine to live in. The visions
of Fuller, Soleri and NASA all reflect a similar interpretation of
the metaphor.
13. Thus Drexler writes of J. Stirling's 1964 Cambridge University
History Building, published as a hard-lined axonometric: "Where
architecture seeks to emulate the look of machinery, with complex
shapes, chamfered corners and moveable bits of hardware, the axono-
metric seems to generate its own design solutions. A model can
include more information, but only by sacrificing schematic
elegance." (12) p. 21, note.
14. Note, too, the role that the notation system plays here: the
designer may make modifications to the representation which is the
original statement (if, for example, it is a plan, he may move all
the elements around in plan, concentrating on such evaluations as
are best facilitated by the conventions of the plan system). Alter-
nately, a different kind of representation of the initial statement
may be made, for example, a section or perspective, in which the
original display is modified and evaluated on the basis of its con-
tent as shown by the conventions of these other systems.
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ILLUSTRATIONS
1 Plan
2 Section
3 Elevation
4 Isometric
Each illustration presents a simplified plan of the Pantheon in accu-
rate, two-point perspective with the corresponding image above. Plan and
section after R.M. Boyle reproduced in W.L. MacDonald, The Pantheon Design,
Meaning and Progeny, (Cambridge: Harvard, 1976); isometric afterpJate in
L. Benevelo, Storia della Citta, (Rome: Laterza,1976).
The illustrations are not referenced to particular parts of the text
but rather attempt to provide a visual equivalent for the arguments which
are put forth in Sections 1 and 2.
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